

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**Master degree in**

**Global Politics and Euro-Mediterranean Relations**

**FINAL DISSERTATION IN COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY**

---

Antonio Ludovico Mangiameli

**The way for a social sustainability? Welfare, labour  
market and the analysis on minimum wage and  
universal basic income in the EU**

*Illustrious Professor Arcidiacono*

---

AA 2023/2024

## INDEX

Introduction	4
Chapter 1: Welfare, poverty, unemployment and the social sustainability in the EU	5
1.1: Introducing the importance of social protection	5
1.2: Welfare State: definition, origins, models	6
1.2.1: Some strategies adopted: retrenchment, resilience, recalibration	12
1.3: A perspective on the actual European situation	15
1.3.1: Labour market in the EU	19
1.3.2: A deeper analysis on EU data	26
Chapter 2: Analysis on poverty, unemployment and social sustainability: a comparison between Italy and Germany	34
2.1: Who are the new poor?	34
2.1.2: Individual consequences of being a working poor in the EU	36
2.2: Italy and Germany: a socioeconomic comparison in terms of welfare and employment	39
2.2.1: Welfare: two opposite approaches	42
2.3: The effects of poverty in the EU: a comparative analysis between Italy and Germany	44
2.3.1: Security: poverty and crime	45
2.3.2: Poverty and political participation: crucial differences	55
2.3.3: Poverty, environment and SDGs	57

Chapter 3: Minimum salary and Universal Basic Income: crucial means towards a social sustainability?	65
3.1: The minimum wage	65
3.1.1: Minimum wage in the EU	66
3.1.2: Some effects of minimum wage: a focus on Germany	68
3.1.3: A first balance on minimum wage	72
3.2: The Universal Basic Income: an introduction	73
3.2.1: UBI on the theoretical level	74
3.2.2: UBI, a practical perspective: work in progress? Pilot projects and experiments	78
3.2.3: A first balance on UBI	86
3.3: Digitalization: a further reason for a path towards social sustainability?	87
3.4: A final balance	93
Conclusion	95
Acknowledgments	97
Sources	98

## INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to understand the importance of social policies in the actual context. The context referred in this case, is presented by a specific space and a specific time: the former is the EU, the latter is both the present and the future. In a changing world, characterized by high levels of consumption, quality standards have changed. Furthermore, labour market has developed new features, following new challenges. In this moment of changes, a crucial challenge must be taken into consideration: sustainability. Intended mostly on an environmental level, sustainability involves also social and economic dynamics. As a consequence, institutions working towards a sustainability need to find the best solution in order to pursue a sustainable development. EU, on the global stage, plays a crucial role, as will be presented. In this challenging context, in order to pursue sustainability, society is a very relevant actor. In fact, problems deriving from poverty, unemployment or an inefficient labour market, do affect more spheres, menacing the path towards sustainability. For this reason, this work will focus on identifying the most efficient path or some of the most important features of this path. After presenting the EU frame in this sense, the qualitative analysis on socioeconomic terms will take into consideration two crucial Member States: Italy and Germany. Here, the role of social policies, social protection, and, of the State in general, becomes very strategic. As a consequence, understanding and presenting the importance of welfare and social protection, two measures will be analyzed and compared: the minimum wage and the Universal Basic Income. In understanding those measures, the aim will be to understand how social policies can be crucial in the socioeconomic development towards a sustainability, having also in mind the strategic role played by the EU.

# Chapter 1: Welfare, poverty, unemployment and the social sustainability in the EU

The first chapter has two aims: on the one side presenting the key issues and topics, crucial for the dissertation; on the other side, the goal is to understand the frame (geographic, economic, social) involving those topics. More in particular, topics are linked mostly to welfare and labour market, while the frame is, specifically the EU context.

## 1.1. Introducing the importance of social protection

When mentioning social sustainability, poverty, social protection, the idea is to understand and describe the socioeconomic condition of an individual in the society. Poverty can be measured through different perspectives, creating a relevant number of indicators that can be used to understand the phenomena. Nowadays the idea of poverty is linked also to the concept of work: in fact, the issue of *working poor* is becoming crucial. In Europe, the idea of poverty is usually linked to unemployment, but data and dynamics have changed this vision, linking poverty also to the field of employment. For this reason, the idea of protecting individual from socioeconomic difficulties, as will be shown, becomes crucial.

*“For millennia, poverty and starvation have been the fate of the largest part of human kind. “Nature’s parsimony”, as Ricardo once put it, has only been overcome quite recently. Since about two centuries, per capita income and consumption grow exponentially despite the rapidly rising human population (Maddison 2001). In the most advanced economies, already lower-income classes can now enjoy a standard of living that two centuries ago would have resembled a state of affluence. (...) In the high-income economies, however, the reality of consumption has moved far beyond such conditions, and the growing expenditures serve purposes whose welfare-improving effects are not so obvious. Phenomena such as hedonic adaptation, self-*

*image problems, and positional (status) preferences, raise doubts about the welfare-enhancing quality of these choices.”<sup>1</sup>*

Because of changes in lifestyle, standard of life and also of economic conditions, poverty as a condition has changed too, involving the necessity to adopt new strategies. For this reason, concept concerning the distribution of resources (inequality), working-poor, absolute and relative poverty are relevant in understanding the phenomena. As far as new kind of tools and approaches to develop socioeconomic conditions are debated on the academic and on the political level, it is crucial to understand which could be the best perspective to improve individuals conditions: this needs to take into account sovra-national and global aims, in order to reach a full development. This first chapter will firstly present and describe welfare on a theoretical level, and then give a frame on Europe on labour and socioeconomic terms.

## 1.2. Welfare state: definition, origins and models

Welfare state can be defined in different ways. From a broader point of view, it can be intended as the social protection granted by the State, that, as main principles and values has equality, social-economic well-being, and, more in particular, equal distribution of resources, opportunities, wealth. The aim, as a consequence, is represented by the improvement of social condition. From this perspective, some features of the welfare state can be identified, including concrete political measures, social problems, economical dynamics, or even indicators, that together constitute features and key-words of welfare state: wages, unemployment, housing, poverty, health, basic living conditions, universal income, economical assistance are some of them.

---

<sup>1</sup> Witt, U. The evolution of consumption and its welfare effects. *J Evol Econ* **27**, 273–293 (2017).  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-016-0459-3>

It has been not totally agreed on the birth of the welfare, but some steps are crucial to have an idea on the development of welfare across the history through different standards:

- 1) First introduction of social insurance. When a State understands that categories and social groups that have difficulties to live (because of sickness, unemployment, old age...), must be protected through concrete financial assistance, translated into compensation; in the case of unemployment, social insurance has developed later.
- 2) The extension of citizenship the de-pauperization of public welfare. As a consequence of the first point, the State, in deepening and enforcing not only its role but also its duties towards the citizen, starts to improve its welfare too. With universal suffrage, and development of rights, welfare has become more efficient in identifying and meeting needs of citizen, and, as a result, also more important considering its role in the State.
- 3) Growth of social expenditure. In understanding the development of welfare during the history, this is another crucial criterion. In fact, in particular during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the amount of public spending has increasingly grown.

When considering origins of welfare state, some examples back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century are crucial.

From a chronological perspective, the oldest example of measure that laid the foundation for welfare, is given by the insurance model of Bismarck, that became relevant during the last thirty years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Different steps can be identified through the years: 1871, 1883, 1889. The first case refers to insurance related to industrial accidents, with the Employer's Liability Act, that supplies compensation when a workman is killed or injured by an accident. In 1883, a protection concerning health was developed with the Sickness Bill, that is linked to health. Initially, only blue-collar were addressed: in the first years, workmen covered by this protection represented only 10% ca. of the population. This health protection for workers not only covered treatment costs, women in childbed, case of death, but

also included cash benefits in case of illness, childbirth. Concerning a first form of pensions, the old age and disability insurance of 1889 represented a first step in this sense. In fact, retirement age was set at 70, and the act issued both a compensation for who retired and for those in a condition of occupational disability.

It is interesting to see how the appearance of measures that created the conditions for the development of a welfare State is linked to the 2<sup>nd</sup> point mentioned before, related to the extension of citizenship. The expansion of citizenship, and, in particular the expansion of male universal suffrage, represented a step forward: in fact, in enlarging the right to vote, States enforced their role and also their duties towards society. Those who firstly achieved male universal suffrage, were also those States that firstly adopted and developed forms of welfare measures, and in particular Germany, France, New Zealand, Denmark. If, in general terms, the first step can be placed in the last part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the second step has taken place between the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In conclusion, concerning the third criterion useful to understand the origins of welfare, the context has been more complex. In fact, when talking about the growth of social expenditure, two factors have been crucial: firstly, the two factors mentioned before, with particular relevance of the extension of citizenship, that forced the State to operate in including and meeting the needs of citizens, who start to play an increasingly crucial role into the State: this was enforced by the increasing awareness on rights (social rights). Another factor has been represented by the wars. With the outbreak of the first World War firstly, and of the Second World War after, social expenditure became needed, also to protect citizens who suffered from the War. The levels of social expenditure raised in the period between the two wars.

If before 1900 only Germany and Switzerland had already reached a social expenditure of 3% on the GDP, by the half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, mostly every State of those considered, had reached a thresold of 5%.

Since that moment, with the development of international relations, of sovranational institutions, but also with the appearance of new social and economical models,



welfare has become increasingly important. Nowadays, still in the most advanced economies and political powers, welfare maintains a crucial position both on the public and on the political agenda. This dissertation will focus on Europe, where the development of welfare and of the labour market is still on the top of the agenda of all countries. In fact, welfare and labour market are two faces of the same coin, and are both related to the basic existence and the human development of every citizen, and, in general terms to the idea of social sustainability. Even supranational institutions now increasingly put aims related to poverty, salaries, compensations, as will be seen. Before describing some of the most important models of welfare, it is crucial to mention the diamond of welfare. According to this concept, the welfare is based on three elements: State, family, market, and Third Sector (Intermediate associations). These are considered as the main elements contributing to the wealth of citizens. In the last thirty years, the role and the relation of and between these elements have particularly changed. Because of dynamics such as globalization, the spread of technologies, new consumer models and changes in terms of labour market, State has increasingly been less influential in welfare terms, in favour of the market, who plays a stronger role in determining the political approach. This creates the conditions for the emergence of new phenomena (such as working poor), or the worsening of specific dynamics such as inequality.

*“One result is that inequality is on the rise almost everywhere, as the richest parts of the population –whether the top 10%, 1% or 0.1%– scoop up most of the gains in economic growth. Another is that even market income is not always a reliable source of well-being; we see more people who are the “working poor”, while the labour market fails to absorb vast numbers of work-seekers.”<sup>2</sup>*

Therefore, State intervention can become fundamental to adjust certain dynamics, thanks to welfare measures and adjustments of the labour market. Furthermore, there is also debate on new forms of welfare and the development of the same: for example, the concept of welfare such as community welfare, becomes increasingly interesting for political and social actors. In fact, because of the changes and the emergence of

---

<sup>2</sup> Jenson, J. (2015). Social Innovation: Redesigning the Welfare Diamond. In: Nicholls, A., Simon, J., Gabriel, M. (eds) *New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research*. Palgrave Macmillan, London.  
[https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137506801\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137506801_5)

new entities, the concept of welfare community tries to explain the importance of every actor, without considering the State as the only main actor. This perspective enforces the public-private partnership, and the relation between different actors (not only political or economic but also cultural, social, religious), useful for the common wealth. In fact, if welfare State poses the attention on the role of State towards citizen, community welfare intends dividing this single relation (State-individual), in favour of multiple actors creating a network efficient for the wealth of everyone.

After having described and identified the origins of welfare, it is crucial to define the different models. In fact, across the 19<sup>th</sup> century, different models have emerged. Following the analysis of Esping-Andersen, three models can be described: the liberal, the conservative and the social democratic welfare model.

- 1) The liberal welfare State (**Anglo-Saxon model**). This first model is mostly used in anglo-saxon countries, such as USA, UK and Australia (USA embodies the perfect example of this model). This kind of model has, as aim, to support those unable to support themselves economically. Esping-Andersen defines the liberal welfare State as a State that follows the market rules, but adopts a welfare where beneficiaries are supported mostly through financial means. In fact, two spheres can be identified in understanding this kind of welfare: firstly, the State has a liberal nature, posing free market at the base of its approach. For this reason, the way to support beneficiaries is represented more by private welfare schemes, modest social-insurance plans and less by services (access to health, education): from a qualitative point of view, amount of private financing is not high. As a consequence, it will be duty of the single citizen to find the best way to live in the society and access basic services. Second, the access to welfare is very restricted. Because of the liberal values that are at the base of this model, also the amount of the beneficiaries is low, having strict requirements to access the welfare. In this model there is a society composed by a majority following the market and a minority supported by the welfare.
- 2) The conservative welfare (**Continental model**). The main countries representing this model are France, Germany, Italy and Austria. This model

poses more attention on families, especially because of its historical ties with Catholicism. Tools adopted in this frame are mostly represented by private financing, social insurance schemes and occupation-based support. For this reason the amount of beneficiaries results limited and the nature of them too (mostly linked to families).

- 3) The social democratic welfare (**Nordic model**). This model is typical of Scandinavian countries. It represents the strongest level of welfare, as far as equality represents the strongest value and priority: it promotes the emancipation both of individuals and families, promoting the importance of social rights as pillars of the model. The previous models described were more in favour of a market-based approach, or of a dualism between State and society, while this model embodies the strongest idea of welfare. The aim here in fact, is not only to guarantee a minimal condition, but to promote the highest level of equality within the society. Means used to reach this aim, in this case, are different, constituting tax measures aimed at equal distribution, cash benefits, open access to services but also full-employment. For this reason, following this approach, the amount of beneficiaries is higher and the effects –in particular redistribution- are more efficient.

Another model has emerged during the end of the last century: the Mediterranean welfare. Firstly, for cultural and historical reasons, social protection is featured by a high level of secularization. Second, family constitute a strong basis of social protection, stronger than in any other model, and mostly stronger than the State, reducing developments in terms of welfare. *“The self-reliance of families has traditionally been taken for granted by governments in matters of social care and material support. This has been interpreted as an inevitable consequence of the insufficient policies developed by the Mediterranean welfare state.”*<sup>3</sup>This, on the other side, has permitted to Southern countries to adopt citizenship programmes (social assistance), occupational benefits but also universal services such as health and education. Furthermore, it can be seen how there is a public-private cooperation,

---

<sup>3</sup> Moreno, L. (2006). The Model of Social Protection in Southern Europe: Enduring Characteristics?. *Revue française des affaires sociales*, , 073-095. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfas.en605.0073>

mostly between State and social groups in trying to implement a social protection, with different rules. In conclusion, it must be highlighted how during this century, Mediterranean welfare has been influenced by a high level of liberalization, becoming in some aspects more similar to the Anglo-Saxon model, in terms of approach (market rules as main indicator): *“Southern welfare has in recent times followed a pattern of liberalization in the provision of welfare services. This is noticeable in a certain extension of free-market morals, in the proliferation of “non-profit-making” – but characteristically subsidized – NGOs and other providers within the Third Sector, and in the reinforcement of the process of welfare privatization. The externalization of care services, which have traditionally been made available by the family, has generally meant the purchasing of low-cost assistance supplied in many cases by immigrants in the “underground” economy. This development has been recent and swift. State, regional and local authorities have regarded such an emerging private market with caution and no little relief, as they “save” public monies or devote them to other policies.”*

4

During the 21st century, welfare models have become very differentiated, influenced also by external dynamics, framing welfare depending on the context of the present and on challenges of the future. The analysis will, in chapter two, demonstrate the importance of social sustainability, through the comparison between two different countries: Italy and Germany. Taking into account their importance within the EU, similarities in terms of power within the EU context, these two countries will be crucial to understand general differences between North and Southern EU, considering Germany more similar to the Nordic model (as proved –as will be shown- by a more social sustainable approach).

---

<sup>4</sup>Moreno, L. (2006). The Model of Social Protection in Southern Europe: Enduring Characteristics?. *Revue française des affaires sociales*, , 073-095. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfas.en605.0073>

### 1.2.1. *Some strategies adopted: retrenchment, resilience, recalibration*

Since the last century, many strategies have been adopted in order to achieve an economic improvement or to mitigate an economic worsening. This is linked and has consequences also on the society, depending on the strategy adopted. In fact, the main aim of a specific State is represented by economic improvement, which is mainly identified in the GDP growth. Nowadays, on an academic level, there is a huge debate on the nature of GDP, as far as it argued that it does not measure the effective social wealth. Critics start from a simple doubt: when talking about economic growth – usually in terms of GDP- who are the main beneficiaries?<sup>5</sup> In fact, other indicators (such as the Human Development Index or the Social Progress Index), could be more useful to understand the real socioeconomic conditions of a society. This premise is crucial for understanding the effective impact of the strategies mentioned.

An interesting definition of welfare *retrenchment*, defines it as the '*political decision to reduce the level of social protection guaranteed by the state*'.<sup>6</sup> More concretely, it is intended as the approach that involves cuts on cash benefits or services guaranteed. Specifically, it involves: reducing the number of beneficiaries (quantitative level) and even the nature of the benefit itself (qualitative level). As a consequence, there is a reduction of social protection. Among the most known examples of retrenchment approach on a political level is represented by the approach of Reagan and Thatcher.

*Resilience* in this context is very recent, or, at least, because of external and global dynamics occurred during this century. Resilience can be meant as the capacity to adapt to very critical situations. It is, the concept of adaptation in presence of a menace, or a relevant problem that affects every sphere of the State: conflicts, environmental disasters, are examples of menaces to the State. In this case, the concept of resilience has become popular with pandemic (COVID19). In this context, especially at the EU level, the resilient approach has been common to many governments, during that period. One of the most evident examples of resilience, has

---

<sup>5</sup><https://www.theigc.org/blogs/gdp-adequate-measure-development>

<sup>6</sup> Starke, Peter. 2008. *Radical Welfare State Retrenchment: A Comparative Analysis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

been Italy, with the “Cura Italia” decree of 2020, by the Conte government. This has been a concrete example of resilience. In fact, the decree provided a great amount of social investment (tool) in order to protect, during pandemic, the most vulnerable social group (aim). In order to understand this political intervention, and the entity of a resilient approach, some of the most relevant strategies have been:

- Support to workers with families, wages protection:
  - Economic support (max €600) in order to access baby-sitting services;
  - Creation of a fund ad hoc for loan on the first house: devolved to workers who had –compared to the last 2019 trimester- registered a damage at least of the 33%;
  - Suspension of layoff procedures for 60 days (those procedures launched after the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February 2020);
  - Compensation of €600 for self-employed workers with a VAT number;
  - Tax support for specific workers and social groups
- Specific measures related to the contrast to PANDEMIC and the management of the critical condition:
  - Increase of €85 millions of the fund for the digital innovation, so that education (school, universities) could afford the critic moment in which digitalization has played a crucial role: part of the money is devolved to digital instruments for those students not able to access the adequate tools;
  - Increase of funds devolved to extra working hours for workers in the field of health and security.

There has been also an increase of assumptions (mostly in the field of health and security). This example of resilience by Italy during pandemic is relevant to understand the concept of resilience linked to welfare, aimed at both protecting and giving direct answer to the crisis in question.

With *recalibration*, it is intended a reformulation of welfare schemes, that as a consequence, involves a set of reforms or structural changes. According to Hemerijck<sup>7</sup>, 4 dimensions well explain the concept of welfare recalibration. *Functional recalibration*

---

<sup>7</sup>“Towards developmental welfare: recalibration in Europe”, Anton Hemerijck, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2005

is linked to social risks. Understanding social risk means understanding new needs and new features, both of the society and the labour market (gender question, demographic changes). As a consequence, even welfare needs to get changes. *Distributive recalibration*: changes in Welfare and social protection taking into account different actors linked to the economic sphere, and the market, both public and private actors. The *normative recalibration* refers to a more political and legal approach: in particular, norms and values changing to support a new approach by the welfare (even in this case, gender question, but also migrants or specific aspects such as precariousness in this sphere). In the end, the institutional recalibration involves those changes at an institutional level: structural changes of bodies in this sphere, development on legal and political responsibilities in this sense. In conclusion, it is clear how recalibration refers to reforms, developments of welfare State at different levels.

### 1.3. A perspective on the actual European situation

When considering Europe and, more in particular the situation within the EU, there are many differences, both concerning models adopted and results obtained. In presenting the actual frame, four data will be crucial: absolute poverty, relative poverty, occupation rate, unemployment rate. It is fundamental to define the first two criteria. With absolute poverty, it is intended a condition in which an individual or a family is not able to afford the minimal livable needs: housing, food, health, education. Of course, when talking in concrete terms considering specific economic data (costs of living, salary level), there are changes country by country. On the other side, relative poverty means a condition in which households receive 50% less than average households. It is a condition in which basic needs can be afforded, but living standards (house, internet, clothes, services quality) are lower than average standards of the population taken into consideration. In a world developing on a technological level and creating new standards of living in which consumerism is one of the main features, this poverty condition is taking an important place both on the public and on the political

agenda, creating a group of people that constitutes –because of this condition- a real group of interest in within a country. In general, in the EU, there is a differentiated situation. It can be affirmed that poverty and employment have been increasingly enforcing their position on the political agenda. In fact, EU can indirectly or directly affect welfare and labour market of its member states. In the first case, as far as EU has its own agenda, EU priorities can affect the national level in posing aims concerning even just general principles (ex. equality), that can influence national agendas. In the second case, a concrete tool to act in this sense is represented by directives adopted. Social protection is increasingly becoming a relevant issue, also considering global aims prefixed. The most important are those aims that constitute the UN Agenda 2030. UN sustainable development goals are, in this case, highly shared by the EU, that promotes and is trying to adopt the best strategies in this context.

EU has absorbed this goals, playing a fundamental role in leading and being in example in this sense. In fact, EU, thanks to its member states is the leading donor of the ODA (Official Development Assistance): only in 2022 EU contributed with more than €90 billion, that constitute more than the 40% of global assistance. Taking into account on the one side -by looking at the goals- the social dimension of many of them, and on the other side, the role plaid by EU it is clear how the goals and the socioeconomic approach pursuing more social sustainability becomes a pillar for the EU in the long-term.



When reading the 17 goals, some of the most linked to the concept of social protection are: *no poverty (1), zero hunger (2), good health and well-being (3), decent work and economic growth (8), reduced inequalities (10), peace, justice and strong institutions (16)*. But social protection is also a key to positively influence other spheres, in order to achieve specific goals, such as: *quality education (4), gender equality (5), sustainable*



*cities and communities (11), climate action (13).* Before understanding how social protection can be crucial for a social sustainability (and, as a consequence a general sustainability), a frame on the situation in the EU will be deepened. As said, social protection has increased its importance within EU, but its importance had already been highlighted in the *Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)*, in particular with two articles:

**Article 136 (ex Article 117)**

*The Community and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. To this end the Community and the Member States shall implement measures which take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Community economy. They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the common market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action.*

**Article 137 (ex Article 118)**

*With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 136, the Community shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields:*

- improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers' health and safety;*
- working conditions;*
- the information and consultation of workers;*
- the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to Article 150;*
- equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work.*

A great attention, in this case, is devolved to the labour market, from two points of view. Firstly, concerning the conditions (art.1237), posing workers conditions at the center of any decision in this sphere. Second, in the art.136 a higher value linked to the importance of the labour market is given by the importance of itself in contrasting exclusion and in granting, at the same time, social protection. This last concept was already present in the 1997 Treaty, demonstrating how the role of social protection is longstanding. A further step was made by the 2020 strategy presented in 2010 by the EU Commission: in this case, sustainable development was at the center of it. Of course, under the goal of sustainable development, some goals towards 2020 have been settled in the field of labour market and social protection. In particular, targets referred to *inclusive growth*, by: reaching high levels of employment, reducing the rate of people at risk of poverty, enforcing social protection, creating the conditions in which a qualitative education can meet standards of the labour market (in this last case there is a specific focus on young people). In terms of political approach, the base for the policies in this sense was already set in 1997, with the European Employment Strategy (EES), aimed at improving the quality of employment. It involves both the formulation of guidelines for member States and the mutual cooperation between Member States and the EU. At the basis of the strategy, *flexicurity* is crucial. It is the strategy aimed at reaching on the one side flexibility (in terms of workforce) and on the other side security. In particular, the four grounding elements of the strategy are: *“more flexible and secure contractual arrangements, from the point of view of both employer and worker; lifelong learning strategies in order to ensure workers’ ongoing capacity to adapt, and increase their employability; effective labour market policies in order to facilitate transitions to new jobs; modern social security systems providing adequate income support during transitions”*<sup>8</sup>. The concept of flexicurity has a national origin. In fact, it has been firstly approached in Denmark and the Netherlands. In the first case, it has been adopted to *“explain a positive dynamic generated by liberal redundancy regulations, high unemployment benefits (UB), and active labour market policies (ALMP)”*<sup>9</sup>. The Netherlands can be considered as the country of origin of the

---

<sup>8</sup>EU Commission Communication, “Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security, COM(2007)359 final, 27/07/08

<sup>9</sup>Bekker S, Mailand M. The European flexicurity concept and the Dutch and Danish flexicurity models: How have they managed the Great Recession? Soc Policy Admin. 2019;53:142–155.

concept: in fact, in the mid-1990, a legislation introduced security of employment for part-time and temporary employees. On the European level -as said- flexicurity was part of the EES, but it was in 2006 (when the Commission presented the definition of flexicurity with the four linked grounding elements), that the concept reached its highest status. Flexicurity is still a key strategy of the approach towards labour market.


The following data that will be shown, will be interesting to understand: what has been done so far, which are the main challenges, what should be done. A crucial premise in this sense, must be done: COVID19 (2020) has worsen the situation in this field. Pandemic has constituted a crucial variable, negatively influencing the labour market and increasingly spreading economic and social needs and problems within EU.

### *1.3.1. Labour market in the EU*

Before understanding more specific indicators, a general frame on Europe concerning labour market must be considered. In fact, starting from general indicators, more specific data will be useful to have an efficient frame. Firstly, on employment and unemployment. In terms of the former, EU set in 2017 the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), which involves aims in three different areas: equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions and social protection and inclusion. One of the goals is reaching in 2030 the 78% of employment (people aged 20 to 64). In 2022, the EU employment rate in this regard has been 74%: only five member States register a level of employment under the 70%, while all the others over the same percentage, with 11 member States registering an employment rate higher than the 78% pursued on the EU level. The five countries with a lower level of employment have been: Croatia (69.7%), Spain (69.5%), Romania (68.5%), Greece (66.3%) and Italy (64.8%).

**Tab 1.1:** Employment rate, 2022 age group 20-64

Source: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Press-overseas-2021-ch-Yellow-Orange-Red.png>




The difference between southern and northern member States is very clear. The complementary situation is presented also in terms of unemployment, registering the same frame, of a differentiated Europe. In terms of labour market, the most vulnerable groups are represented by youth, women, and individuals with difficult economic background.

Concerning youth, it must be affirmed how, on the EU level, there has been a decrease in the last decade: in fact, if youth unemployment rate was 9% in 2009, in 2022 the rate registered was 6.3%. Looking at the general frame, the situation is quite differentiated.

**Tab 1.2:** Youth unemployment, 2022 (as % of the total population of the same age; 15-29 years old)

Source: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230524-1>



Best results have been registered by Czechia (2%), Germany, Bulgaria (3.3% both), Hungary and Poland (3.5% both), good results also in Austria (5.2%), Netherlands (5.3%) and Belgium (5.7%); on the opposite, Spain (11.2%), Greece (10.6%), Sweden (10.3%), but also Cyprus (8.8%). Italy registers, anyway, a percentage higher than EU average: 7.4%. In this sense, a strategy is still active: the EU Youth Strategy. It has been adopted after Council Resolution of 26 November 2018, for the period 2019-2027. In the framework of the strategy, 11 goals have been placed, constituting the 11 European Youth Goals. These act in multiple areas, some of the most interesting taking into account socioeconomic conditions and, in general a social sustainability are: *Mental Health & Wellbeing* and *Quality Employment for All*. Mental health is particularly important and linked to socioeconomic conditions that may influence it, as will be demonstrated in the 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter. In fact, contextualizing the goal, the socioeconomic factor is relevant when considering work expectations, pressures: *“Consultation reports described how this situation can leave some with a sense of failure that their lives do not meet the standards expected of them by others and themselves. Whilst it is hard to define what is a realistic or unrealistic life expectations,*

*there was a feeling of a continued failure to achieve unattainable goals. This was said to impact on young people's mental health showing as increased stress, depression or anxiety. Despite this, when facing a crisis, many young people said the stigma associated with mental health prevents them from feeling they can access help, be that informal support from friends and family, or professional support".*<sup>10</sup> As a consequence, goals in this field concern also safeguarding mental health of young people in difficult conditions, because of socioeconomic reasons and because of socioeconomic standards influencing the individual on a psychological level. The *Quality Employment for All* goal focuses exactly on the improvement of socioeconomic conditions. Firstly there is the concept of equality: guaranteeing an equal access to opportunities, education and all those tools useful for being involved in the labour market. Second, the idea of protection, in particular when considering healthcare, working rights and working conditions. In conclusion, the aim of the EU is to assure more equality and improve the level, the conditions and the quality of labour market, in order to facilitate the access for young workers and improve their conditions.

Concerning gender, women employment has registered generally an improvement. In fact, if in 2014 the EU employment rate was 59.6%, in less than ten years, rate has reached the 69.3% in 2022, registering an increase of +9.7% in seven years. In terms of Member States, differences mostly between North and South are a constant. Taking into account the gap between female and male employment, on the European level, having a male employment of 80% and a female employment of 69.3%, the gap is 10.7 pp (percentage points<sup>11</sup>). Countries with a higher gap are Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, but also Poland and Czechia. Worst cases are represented by two Southern countries, Italy and Greece: the former presents a gap of 19.7 pp, with a male employment of 74.7% and a female employment of 55%, while the latter registers a gap of 21 (respectively 76.9% and 55.9%). In the opposite case, some Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia) and many Northern countries do register minimum gaps (less than 5 pp), such as Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium.


---

<sup>10</sup>Structured Dialogue Cycle VI Thematic report, Dan Moxon and OndrejBarta from The Pool of European Youth Researchers <https://zenodo.org/records/3716244#.XnN3XKj0mUk>

<sup>11</sup>[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Percentage\\_point](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Percentage_point)

**Tab 1.3:** Employment rate by sex, 2022 (age group 20-64, percentage of total population for each category)

Source: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Employment\\_rate\\_by\\_sex\\_2022\\_\(age\\_group\\_20-64,\\_percentage\\_of\\_total\\_population\\_for\\_each\\_category\).png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Employment_rate_by_sex_2022_(age_group_20-64,_percentage_of_total_population_for_each_category).png)




Source: Eurostat (dataset code lfsi\_emp\_a)



In the case of gender pay gap, some step forward have been done, but the situation is very differentiated. In this case, situation is very different, having different frames depending on the specific context or indicator taken into account. In terms of gender pay gap in fact, according to 2021 data, situation varies a lot, from the highest pay gap registered by Estonia (20.5%) to the lowest, in Luxembourg (-0.2%). In this sense, the situation is totally heterogeneous. The EU average is 13%, but in this case, there is no clear geographical differentiation between North, South, Eastern Europe. Between the best countries in this terms there are in fact Luxembourg, Romania (3.6%), Italy (5%), Spain (8.9%), Belgium (5%); on the opposite, countries with worse data involve Estonia, Austria (18.8%), Germany (17.6%), Hungary (17.3%), but also Finland (16.5%). In this case, a geographical frame is not clear, because of the differentiated situation in every area.

**Tab 1.4:** The unadjusted gender pay gap, 2021 (difference between average gross hourly earnings of male and female employees as % of male gross earnings)

Source: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg\\_05\\_20/default/table?lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_05_20/default/table?lang=en)



Note: For all the countries except Czechia and Iceland: data for enterprises employing 10 or more employees, NACE Rev. 2 B to S (-O);  
 Czechia: data for enterprises employing 1 or more employees, NACE Rev. 2 B to S; Iceland: NACE Rev. 2 sections C to H, J, K, P, Q.  
 Gender pay gap data for 2021 are provisional until benchmark figures, taken from the Structure of Earnings survey, become available in December 2024.  
 Romania: Estimated data  
 Czechia, Norway: Definition differs (see metadata)  
 Ireland: 2020 data  
 Greece: 2018 data  
 Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg\_05\_20)




Another dimension involves the social mobility, intended as social elevator. Two kind of data are relevant in this sense, in order to understand the trend in the EU. Firstly, data by OECD, according to the analysis *A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility* (2018). According to OECD social mobility is relevant also for economy itself. In fact, in losing potential talents, the productivity and the quality of the economy may be affected. Working on social mobility on the opposite can improve conditions for an economic development. Furthermore, as affirmed in the analysis, on the one side an unequal distribution of resources involves lower social mobility and on the other side involves also lower trust in the political system, favouring lower political participation and rise of populism. As a consequence it is important for governments to work for the improvement of this dimension. OECD, in its analysis has considered both inter- and intra-generational mobility. The former refers to the individual condition (health, occupation, education) compared to the same of the individual's parents, while the latter considers only the individual sphere and the changes in conditions during the life of the individual itself. Coming to the EU situation, according to the Organization, the general overview is quite similar to the frame linked to other data. Northern countries (on a global level) register the best results: in Denmark it



takes two generations for individuals born in low-income families to reach the mean income; in Sweden, Finland (but also Norway) three generations. Spain and Greece register the double of Denmark, four generations. Italy and Portugal five, while countries such as Germany and Austria do not register very good data in this sense: six in the first and five in the second case.

**Tab 1.5:** Income mobility across generations Number of generations it would take for those born in low-income families to approach the mean income in their society)

Source: OECD: A broken social elevator? How to promote social mobility, Figure 1.5



A final issue is more recent. Since the end of the last century, non-standard jobs have increasingly taken place. With non-standard jobs are intended low-paying, part-time, temporary, on-call jobs. In 2019, 41% of workers had non-standard jobs. Workers with

non-standard jobs are counted as employed, but, of course, because of the fragility and the precariousness, two problems constitute a consequence. On the one hand, the economical fragility of this kind of jobs: because of their nature, workers will be part of the rate constituting the AROPE (at risk of poverty), or, depending on the parameters, they will be in a condition of relative poverty, risking to drop in a situation of absolute poverty: as a consequence, having a job and being employed does not mean being part or within the medium economic and social standards of the society. On the other hand, precariousness concerning time. Because of the basic economical level of these jobs, and because of the temporary nature of them, workers will not be able to live and plan in long-term terms, involving also demographic matters to environmental problems. The issue is to identify the best tools in social policy in order to avoid poverty and inequality. Social transfers have seemed very strategic in this sense: according to Eurostat, during the period of Pandemic, social transfers reduced, in 2021, the inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient from 52.2% to 30.1%, mitigating the impact of COVID19 on a huge amount of EU citizens.


### *1.3.2. A deeper analysis on EU data*

The indicator *AROPE* (At risk of poverty) is an indicator mainly composed by three dimensions: *severe material deprivation* (condition in which basic needs can't be satisfied); *very low work intensity*; *income poverty* (the economical level of a household compared to the standards of the population). At the EU level, in 2010 the AROPE rate was 23.9%, while in 2019 it was a little bit lower, 20.9%. Data related to 2022 saw a slight increase, registering a 21.6% of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion: as clear from the graph in the following page, the situation is very differentiated.

**Tab 1.6:** People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2022

Source: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230614-](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230614-1#:~:text=In%202022%2C%2095.3%20million%20people,household%20with%20very%20low%20work)

[1#:~:text=In%202022%2C%2095.3%20million%20people,household%20with%20very%20low%20work](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230614-1#:~:text=In%202022%2C%2095.3%20million%20people,household%20with%20very%20low%20work)




Having in mind what AROPE is and what composes AROPE, other data related to the same variable are crucial do deepen the frame in this sphere.

*Severe material deprivation* can be compared to a condition of absolute poverty: basic needs (housing, food) can't be afforded. Comparing the European level between 2010 and 2019, there has been an improvement: in 2010, the rate of people in severe material deprivation was 8.9%, while in 2019, 5.5%. In 2021 the rate raised, registering a +0,8%, with a 6.3%. In the case of severe deprivation, the differences are highly differentiated. In fact, while many Eastern European member states saw an economic development that made become relevant the reduction –at the EU level- between 2010 and 2019, Mediterranean countries not only haven't registered an improvement, but in some cases even a strong worsening of the situation. EU partly explains this trend with austerity policies adopted after economic crisis (2008): if Italy hasn't registered an improvement in this sense, Spain saw a minimum and not significant improvement, and Greece saw a very heavy worsening of the rate.

**Tab 1.7:** Share of people living in severe material deprivation

Source: EU welfare systems and the challenges of poverty and inequality, EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Authors: Nora Milotay, Eamonn Noonan (editors), Denise Chircop, Klaus Müller, Cecilia Navarra, Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass PE 698.916 – October 2022




*Households with low work intensity: “The work intensity of a household is the ratio of the total number of months that working-age household members (aged less than 65 years) have worked during the income reference year and the total number of months the same household members theoretically could have worked in the same period”.*<sup>12</sup>

If 2010 registered a 9.9%, 2019 highlighted a minimum improvement: 8.8%. Even in this case, the level of differentiation is very high, ranging from less than the 5% of Slovenia to the 13.8% of Greece. In this case, changes were not foregone, registering in 2019 –compared to 2010- a reduction in Hungary (-62%), and Latvia, and important increases in Luxembourg (+59%) and in Greece (+68%). It is interesting to see how, combining these two data, the result is very negative. In fact, the percentage of people (less than 65) living in households with low work intensity registered in 2021, was 62.2%. Worst situation in this regard is in southern and Eastern Europe, but even some central and Nordic countries suffer in this regard.

<sup>12</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living\\_conditions\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_work\\_intensity](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_work_intensity)

**Tab 1.8:** At-risk-poverty rate for people aged-less-than 65 years living in households with very low work intensity, 2021

Source: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living\\_conditions\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_work\\_intensity&oldid=574000](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_work_intensity&oldid=574000)



Having understood more kind of data related to socioeconomic conditions in the EU, a clear frame emerges: center and Nordic member states do have better indexes, even if, since 2008 crisis and especially because of pandemic, socioeconomic situation has in some cases worsen (especially because of regional issues, differences *within* the country), but generally speaking is stable. Southern States have basically worsened their situation: the Greek case is the most known, but Italy too has worsened its situation in some spheres, as will be demonstrated further ahead. Eastern countries have a very mixed situation: in general terms, because of the passage to a more modern economy, the economic development has improved socioeconomic conditions in many of these States.


This kind of data explain a problem that is common in Europe: poverty. Firstly, poverty is a condition that, especially during the 21<sup>st</sup> century (because of changes in social living standards), has changed from a qualitative point of view (there will be a qualitative analysis in a dedicated section): because of its nature and its form (what is poverty today, which social actors are involved). Second, this condition is a consequence both of unemployment (an inefficient labour market) and of a non-efficient welfare. The main ways to contrast poverty, in general terms are, consequently: reaching a quite full employment, working on increasing employment rate, improving worker's conditions, and improving welfare, both from a qualitative (efficient support) and a quantitative (an inclusive welfare) point of view. When talking about poverty and unemployment, another factor (both cause and effect) is *inequality*. Inequality in Europe (considering in particular EU member states) had seen a reduction after WW2, until 1990, when situation changed. In fact, according to Aktinson, the main reasons for the decrease after WW2 were represented on the one side by the development of welfare, social provisions, while on the other side by progressive taxation, useful for a more equal redistribution. Since 1990, situation in Europe has not improved, and, in some cases is even worse. In fact, until the 80s, States interventions concerning minimal wage and lower-paid workers have been crucial in reducing inequalities. Since 1990s, a new approach more based on market regulations rules and less by State's intervention, has reopened dynamics for inequality, enlarging again the socio-economical polarization. An interesting feature is that inequality during the 21<sup>st</sup> century manifested more *within* countries (regional level) than *between* countries (national level). According to Checchi and Garcia Penalosa<sup>13</sup>, a countertrend would be crucial in reducing inequalities: unemployment benefits and strong employment protection, in legal terms. In fact, even if the phenomenon is more within than between countries, on EU level, something more could be done as far as, still the top 10% captures the 36% of national income: compared to MENA, Europe is very developed from this point of view, but the distance from East Asia (there 10% captures the 43%) or Russia & Central Asia (10% makes around the 45%) is not too far.

---

<sup>13</sup> D. Checchi and C García-Peñalosa (2008). Labour market institutions and income inequality. *Economic Policy*, 23(56), 602-649

**Tab 1.9:** The poorest half lags behind: Bottom 50%, middle 40% and top 10% income shares across the world in 2021

Source: Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G. et al. World Inequality Report 2022, World Inequality Lab.




When considering inequality, there is also to have in mind two more variables: inflation and salaries.

Inflation happens when there is a broad increase in the prices of goods and services, not just of individual item, as defined by the ECB. This is linked to the cost of living, which increases. This means that a wide range of goods are more expensive: from food to rent, from clothes to specific services. Eurostat, has registered the trend of inflation in EU since 1997, taking into consideration a specific indicator, the Harmonized Index of Consumer Price, which “is used to measure consumer price inflation. That means the change over time in the prices of consumer goods and services purchased by euro area households”.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, inflation affects the entire society. In the following page, the diagram by Eurostat referred to the inflation trend in the above-mentioned period.

<sup>14</sup>[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/macroeconomic\\_and\\_sectoral/hicp/html/index.en.html](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/macroeconomic_and_sectoral/hicp/html/index.en.html)

**Tab 1.10:** Harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) inflation rate of the European Union from January 1997 to January 2023

Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/685943/cpi-inflation-rate-europe/>



It is clear how consumer prices (goods and services) have grown: this means that living costs are higher. As a consequence, salaries play in this circumstance a crucial role. Comparing data on salary levels, the crucial role of the same emerges. In particular, when comparing southern member States and center and Nordic member States. The Inflation-adjusted wages indicator is crucial in understanding how situation has been differentiated within EU, and how salaries are another variable for understanding the origins and causes of the actual EU frame in this regard. With this indicator (also known as “real salaries”), it is intended the real value of salaries, related to the level of inflation.

Difference between euro-zones is evident considering inflation-adjusted wages in a period between 1990 and 2020. As said, the fast-economic development –because of the structural economic change– makes register, on average, a 200% growth of real salaries, in Eastern Europe. From the +15.5% of Netherlands to the 63% of Sweden, central and Nordic member States registered, on average a 33.2% ca. growth of real salaries. In the end, southern Member States, registered the worse data: apart the Greek case (because of the specific context after the economic fall), growth of real



salaries has been very low, explaining in part the worsening in many areas and contexts of the socioeconomic trend. If Portugal registered a +13.7% since 1990, Spain registered only a +6.2% and Italy is the only European case in which real salaries have dropped, with a -2.9%, since 1990.

## 2. Analysis on poverty, unemployment and social sustainability: a comparison between Italy and Germany

After having framed the concept of social protection, welfare, after having understood the frame on poverty and labour market in the EU, the following chapter will try to understand the effects deriving from poverty and from an inefficient labour market. In fact, it is crucial to understand why is it important to work on these two spheres. The analysis in this chapter will compare two economic and political strong EU Member States: Italy and Germany. The former, without a minimum wage and with a Mediterranean welfare model; the latter has quite recently introduced the legislation on minimum wage and embodies many traits of the Nordic model (as will be shown), especially in terms of cash benefits and equality promotion. This is preceded by some considerations in terms of new poverty in the EU (qualitative dimension), and some of the direct effects on individuals.

### 2.1. Who are the new poor?

The main effect of unemployment and a fragile welfare is poverty. As already said, the concept of poverty has changed, as far as economic and social standards have changed too. In order to understand the entity of poverty as dynamic, it is crucial firstly to identify who the new poor are, and which effects does poverty cause, in order to understand why it is fundamental to solve this issue. Firstly, it is important to define poverty. As said in chapter 1, two kinds of poverty can be distinguished, the absolute and the relative poverty, and this is a crucial concept to fix in mind in order to understand the analysis:

*“Absolute or extreme poverty: when people lack the basic needs for subsistence. For instance they may be starving, lack clean water, proper housing, sufficient clothing or*

*medicines and be struggling to stay alive. This is most common in developing countries, even if some people in the European Union still face this type of extreme poverty; Relative poverty: when people's way of life and income is so much worse than the general standard of living in the place they live, that they struggle to participate in ordinary economic, social and cultural activities. Relative poverty thus depends on the standard of living enjoyed by the majority in society.*<sup>15</sup>

This distinction is crucial to understand the nature of new poor during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In fact, if absolute poverty is a well-known dynamic, relative poverty is increasingly becoming a relevant issue both on the public and on the private agenda. The concept of relative poverty, as said, is linked to a non-sufficient condition and it is compared to an idea of average social and economic standard. In this context actors involved are individuals that have already a job, but still do not live in a sufficient condition, intended as the average standard in a specific country or region. For this reason, social groups that live in a condition similar to relative poverty are often identified with the term *working poor* (or, as general indicator, *in-work poverty*). At the EU level, working poor are considered those whose equivalised disposable income is below the 60% of national household median income level. According to Eurostat, working poor in the EU in 2019 represented around the 9% (considering workers living in households that are at risk of poverty).

It is important to give a more specific frame on causes linked to this phenomena. Firstly, two kind of factors must be distinguished: individual and institutional factors. The former refers to elements directly linked to the individual; elements that were mentioned, through data, in the first chapter. Low wage plays the major role in this sense, in fact, most of the individuals at risk of poverty are low-paid. Further individual factors are education and gender. In the first case the question is represented by low-level of education and low-paid jobs: as a consequence a low-level education condition increases the chance of earning less and becoming a working poor. In the second case, the question is linked in particular to salaries differences between men and women: in

---

<sup>15</sup>[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/579099/EPRS\\_IDA\(2016\)579099\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/579099/EPRS_IDA(2016)579099_EN.pdf)

this case EU has moved a lot of step forward in ameliorating the situation, taking into account the there is a very differentiated situation within EU member States. Same discourse with the question of the intergenerational mobility. In the end, the question of the jobs' precariousness. In fact, as explained, non-standard jobs play a crucial role in this sense. If many years ago the question was to improve rates concerning employment and unemployment, nowadays, with new kind of jobs and contracts, this rates are not enough when analyzing a specific context, such as the EU. Workers with non-standard jobs are counted in the employment rate, even if many of them are not able to conduct a fully decent life, if compared to the average standard. When considering institutional standards, the main elements are linked to State and governance. Welfare plays a fundamental role in mitigating the impact of unemployment. More elements constituting the institutional factors, are referred to the legislation on minimum wage (it will be better discussed), legislation on employment protection and tax structure and the access to services relevant in framing the socioeconomic condition of a specific worker (childcare, maternity).

### *2.1.2. Individual consequences of being a working poor in the EU*

Condition of working poor has psychological and social features relevant to identify this phenomenon as a concrete problem. In fact, the subjective well-being of individual is taken into account periodically by the EU. In this frame, it is extremely clear how working poor do live in a non-decent situation, not only from a pretty economical point of view.

**Tab 2.1:** Average life satisfaction and meaning of life scores among the working poor, working population and working-age population, EU, 2013

Source: Eurofound (2017), *In-work poverty in the EU*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

	Life	
	satisfaction	Meaning of life
Working, at risk of poverty	6.5	7.2
Working, in deprivation	6.1	6.9
Working population	7.3	7.6
Working-age population	7.1	7.5

Note: Data based on all working-age people (16–64 years). Life satisfaction and meaning of life are measured on a scale of 0–10.

It is evident how working people in a condition of at risk of poverty or deprivation are on the one side less satisfied with their life and on the other (“meaning of life”), less concerned about life, intended as set of goals, values, purposes. As a consequence, mental well-being is influenced by the socioeconomic condition. Other data reveal the same dynamics when deepening feelings linked to mental well-being.

**Tab 2.2:** Mental well-being indicators among the working poor, working population and working age population, EU, 2013

Source: Eurofound (2017), *In-work poverty in the EU*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

	All or most of the time feels ...				Is happy all or most of the time %
	Very nervous %	Down in the dumps %	Calm and peaceful %	Downhearted or depressed %	
Working, at risk of poverty	18.2	9.7	50.6	10.5	50.5
Working, in deprivation	23.3	14.1	44.2	14.1	41.1
Working population	13.1	5.7	60.4	5.9	63.4
Working-age population	15.2	7.9	58.1	8.2	60.4

Note: Data based on all working-age people (16–64 years).

Another dynamic affecting working poor is social exclusion. As clear from other data, there are many problems originated from the condition of being working poor. Firstly, less satisfaction with personal relationships, and, as a consequence, less trust in others. Being not in the condition of conducting –at least- a standard of living similar to the average (in terms of goods, activities, hobbies), will, as a consequence, economically and socially exclude the individual. From the table, it is visible how, another problem –very linked to mental well-being- of working poor (working people in deprivation or at risk of poverty), in the field of social relations, is the difficulty to share personal issues. The worst indicator on qualitative terms is not finding help from other individuals of the society: data of working poor are more similar to those of individual in a condition of material deprivation than to the average working population. This, according to this data, is very spread in Italy, Belgium, Portugal, where more than the 20% of working people reporting material deprivation is not able to find help from other people.

**Tab 2.3:** Relationships, trust and support among the working poor, working population and working-age population, EU, 2013

Source: Eurofound (2017), *In-work poverty in the EU*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

	Satisfaction with personal relationships (scale of 0–10)	Trust in others (scale of 0–10)	Nobody to discuss personal matters with	No help from others
Working, at risk of poverty	7.5	5.4	9.6%	9.6%
Working, in deprivation	7.2	5.2	11.2%	12.6%
Working population	7.9	5.9	5.2%	5.0%
Working-age population	7.8	5.8	6.3%	6.4%

Note: Data based on all working-age people (16–64 years).

**Tab 2.4:** Feelings of social exclusion among the working poor, working population and working-age population, Eu, 2016

Source: Eurofound (2017), *In-work poverty in the EU*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

	I feel left out of society %	Life has become so complicated today that I almost can't find my way %	I feel that the value of what I do is not recognised by others %	Some people look down on me because of my job situation or income %
Working, at risk of poverty	12	21	29	21
Working, in deprivation	12	30	34	28
Working population	5	12	18	13
Working-age population	7	16	20	15

Note: Data based on population aged 18–64 years.

Generally speaking, it is evident how poverty affects mental condition of citizens. This becomes a collective problem when consequences may affect the society or involve it in an indirect way. Following a comparison between two EU member states, in the next section this last issue will be discussed.

## 2.2. Italy and Germany: a socioeconomic comparison in terms of welfare and employment


At this point, a comparison between Italy and Germany becomes relevant in order to understand which tools could be useful to improve socioeconomic conditions, in order to have a general improvement, taking into account supra-national and global aims.

In the case of Germany, two indicators will be taken in consideration: severe material and social deprivation and at-risk-of poverty (AROPE) rate. Looking at the graph, difference is very relevant, as mentioned in chapter 1, when talking about southern countries in general terms. Germany, in 2021 registered a severe material deprivation rate of 4.2%, while Italy registered around the 6%. In the case of AROPE, Italy registers more than 20% in 2021, while Germany around 15%.

**Tab 2.5:** Material and social deprivation rate an at-risk poverty rate, 2021 (%)

Source: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_material_deprivation_and_economic_strain)

[explained/index.php?title=Living\\_conditions\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_material\\_deprivation\\_and\\_economic\\_strain](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_material_deprivation_and_economic_strain)



Notes: 1. The severe material and social deprivation rate refers to the share of the population experiencing an enforced lack of at least seven out of 13 items (six related to the individual and 7 related to the household) that are deemed to be desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life. 2. The threshold for at risk of poverty is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers).

(\*) Provisional.

(\*) 2020.

(\*) Break in time series.

(\*) 2018.

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: ilc\_mdmsd07 ilc\_mdmsd11 and ilc\_li02)

eurostat

This distance between the two countries can be explained through different factors. In fact, taking in mind tables of chapter 1, people at risk of poverty (mostly working poor) reach higher percentages. Considering the percentage on the population (and not the share of the population like AROPE rate), both the German and the Italian case register more than the 20%, with Italy, reaching the 25%.

Another crucial difference concerns NEET and black market. With NEET it is intended “young people (aged 15-29) neither in employment nor in education or training”. The gap between Italy and Germany is very wide. In 2022, Italy registered the record of male NEET<sup>16</sup>: 17.7%. Even female NEET rate has been dramatic, registering a 20.5% (only Romania registered worse data, 25.4%). Germany (together with countries such as Sweden, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Denmark, Portugal) was able to register a global percentage under the 10%, reaching EU-target of 2030. The European average in 2022 has been 11.7%, while the average target for 2030 is 9%. Italy has quite the double


<sup>16</sup> [https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2023/05/26/italy-has-highest-male-neet-rate-in-eu-eurostat\\_dd78c9e7-ff66-4a71-8cc8-eb1abecaf1ce.html#:~:text=17.7%25%20of%20young%20men%20not%20in%20employment%2C%20education%20or%20training&text=\(ANSA\)%20%2D%20ROME%2C%20MAY,29%20was%2017.7%25%20last%20year.](https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2023/05/26/italy-has-highest-male-neet-rate-in-eu-eurostat_dd78c9e7-ff66-4a71-8cc8-eb1abecaf1ce.html#:~:text=17.7%25%20of%20young%20men%20not%20in%20employment%2C%20education%20or%20training&text=(ANSA)%20%2D%20ROME%2C%20MAY,29%20was%2017.7%25%20last%20year.)



percentage of NEET if compared to Germany. The frame that comes out presents, also in this case, a divided Europe where Southern (with the exception of Malta) and Eastern countries (Romania, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Slovakia) have register high percentage of NEET, while Northern countries register a better situation in this sense.

**Tab 2.6:** Young people (aged 15-29) neither in employment nor in education and training, 2022 (by sex, in %)

Source: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Statistics\\_on\\_young\\_people\\_neither\\_in\\_employment\\_nor\\_in\\_education\\_or\\_training](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Statistics_on_young_people_neither_in_employment_nor_in_education_or_training)



As explained in the first chapter, it is important to mention again salaries, which play a crucial role: Italy is the only member State that has not raised salaries for decades, considering the increasing of inflation and cost of life. Having an overlook on data on the two countries, it is important to define two major differences in terms of approach of the same countries, in facing poverty.

### 2.2.1. Welfare: two opposite approaches

In terms of welfare, Italy and Germany present two different approaches, and 2022 has been an emblematic year in this sense.

On the one side, Italy has decided to replace the citizenship income (*Reddito di cittadinanza, RdC*), adopted in 2019 (the strongest welfare measure adopted in Italy in terms of economic support to face poverty), while Germany has increase its citizenship income, in terms of economic benefit (*Bürgergeld*). In general terms, if Germany has decided to invest in welfare, Italy chose the opposite approach. Deepening the nature of the measures, differences are very relevant.

Firstly, in terms of beneficiaries: criteria in this sense differ. The Italian income is based on the ISEE, an indicator that explains the economic condition. It considers the salary level and the value of movable and immovable assets (real and personal properties): it starts from the economic condition of the specific individual or family. On the opposite, Germany starts from the national economic conditions, identifying a threshold under which an individual is entitled to the benefit. This threshold is the “standard support requirement” (*Regelbedarf*), that “refers to the fixed-rate amounts with which you can cover your daily living costs. These include, for example, expenses for food, clothing and electricity. The exact amount depends, among others, on how old you are and whether you live alone or with other people.”<sup>17</sup>

As a consequence, the number of beneficiaries is extremely different. On the one hand, the Italian case: the 2019 citizenship involved, as its highest peak, 3.9 millions of individuals (2021).<sup>18</sup> According to data, 2021 counted 2.3 millions of unemployed and 2.5 millions of *inactive* (unemployed who are not seeking for a job), counting a group of circa 5 million possible beneficiaries.<sup>19</sup> With the new measure (*MIA*) under the new government, both the number of beneficiaries and of the benefit will be lower. The measure is still ongoing, and concrete data will be available in 2024. Actually, there are some esteems and already some effects, because of the stop of the old RdC. In fact,

---

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/en/financial-support/citizens-benefits>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/il-reddito-cittadinanza-premia-single-sono-44percento-beneficiari-AExOkyaB>

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/tra-disoccupati-e-scoraggiati-quasi-5-milioni-persone-inserire-lavoro-AEffloKC>

with MIA, according to esteems<sup>20</sup>, one third of the old beneficiaries will be excluded. This is because of the requirements that have changed. For example, with the RdC the ISEE under which an individual could apply for the benefit was €9360, while now is €7200. In addition to this, also the nature of the benefit is going to change. In the case of unemployable individuals, there are doubts on the maintenance of the integration of €280 for rent expenses, while in the case of employable, the monthly benefit will decrease from €500 to €375. Reduction are present also in terms of the duration of the benefit (depending on the case –in particular concerning employable individuals-, a reduction from 18 to 12 months) and the possibility to ask for it after a specific period. In conclusion, this means a cut of around €3 billions each year, on the circa €8 billions of the RdC.

On the opposite, the German case. In fact, Germany decided to increase features of its measure (Bürgergeld). In 2022, it counted around 2.5 millions circa of unemployed units. In 2023, Germany decided<sup>21</sup>: for example, for individuals alone, from €502 to €563. This is particularly due to inflation. The average increase is of €50. The number of people that will be entitled to the benefit is of around 5.5 millions of individuals. According to data<sup>22</sup>, Germany has always supported a high number of people in difficult economic conditions: since 2010 the number of people supported has decrease, registering on the other side a little decrease in the last years.

---


<sup>20</sup> <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2023/03/07/mia-il-nuovo-reddito-di-cittadinanza-riduce-importi-e-beneficiari-come-si-puo-vivere-con-375-euro/7088357/>

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article247165228/Buergergeld-Mehr-als-5-Millionen-Bezieher-erhalten-deutlich-hoehere-Leistungen.html>

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1359792/recipients-of-benefits-germany/>

**Tab 2.7:** Number of benefit recipients in millions

Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1359792/recipients-of-benefits-germany/>



In conclusion, when considering welfare and socioeconomic data, Germany has for sure done more in terms of welfare, believing in the importance of it. At this point, it is relevant to understand which measures could be the most useful and effective. This work will consider two of the most debated tools: on the one side the minimum salary, while on the other the universal basic income.

### 2.3. The effects of poverty in the EU: a comparative analysis between Italy and Germany

After having understood origins and factors of poverty (why still poverty?), and after having explained poverty nowadays on a qualitative level (what is poverty today?), giving an idea of its consequences on individuals, it is useful to change perspective. In fact, if a set of factors *determining* poverty can be described, there is also a set of consequences *-deriving* from poverty-that can be identified: even in this case, consequences do affect both individuals (social level) and the State (institutional level).

This can be better understood through comparison between countries or areas within the EU.

### 2.3.1. Security: poverty and crime

Depending on the perspective, it is evident how poverty can be linked to criminality. On the theoretical level there are different perspectives on this, but in this analysis this dimension is also crucial. Of course it must be contextualized, but as it will be shown, the linkage seems clear, in this context. According to an interesting article on Science<sup>23</sup>, inequality and deprivation do involve higher criminality and less trust in the government. Firstly, a condition of deprivation involves more chances for an individual to choose non-legal path for economic and social (sense of inequality) reasons:

*“individuals perceive the magnitude of social differentials in the society around them, and this affects their state of mind, increasing competitiveness, anxiety and self-serving individualism (...) Within criminology, our prediction of risky exploitative behaviour when in danger of falling below a threshold of desperation is reminiscent of Merton’s strain theory of deviance. Under this theory, deviance results when individuals have a goal (remaining constantly above the threshold of participation in society), but the available legitimate means are insufficient to get them there (neither foraging alone nor cooperation has a large enough one-time payoff). They thus turn to risky alternatives, despite the drawbacks of these (see also Ref.32 for similar arguments).<sup>24</sup>*

The worsening of the economic situation can consequently increase crime rate. It is interesting to highlight how inequality is so relevant: the unfair distribution of resources and the consequent worsening of individual situation is a key in this regard. Before comparing data in this regard, an overview on Europe is useful. According to the following table, since 1999, the situation in EU has worsened, taking into account two indicators in understanding inequality: income inequality and wealth inequality.


---

<sup>23</sup>De Courson, B., Nettle, D. Why do inequality and deprivation produce high crime and low trust?. *Sci Rep* **11**, 1937 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-80897-8>

<sup>24</sup>De Courson, B., Nettle, D. Why do inequality and deprivation produce high crime and low trust?. *Sci Rep* **11**, 1937 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-80897-8>

**Tab 2.8:** Income and wealth inequality in euro area countries, 1999-2020

Source: Bergbauer, Stephanie & Giovannini, Alessandro & Hernborg, Nils, 2022. "Economic inequality and public trust in the European Central Bank," Economic Bulletin Articles, European Central Bank, vol. 3.



Source: World Inequality Database.

Note: Average Gini of euro area countries weighted by population size and adjusted for euro area accession.


Following the affirmations of the article and the EU frame, conditions for criminality and less trust in governments have spread, in particular since 2008's economic crisis. In order to deepen the comprehension of this linkage, an analysis and comparison on and within EU countries in this sense becomes crucial.

Taking into consideration Italy and Germany, the impact of poverty in this sense is evident. Firstly, it is interesting to understand how wealth is distributed on a regional level, starting with Germany, according to a 2020 report<sup>25</sup>:

<sup>25</sup>"Regional Inequality in Germany: Where Do the Rich Live and Where Do the Poor Live?", Lea Immel, Andreas Peichl, ifoInstitut, München, 2020, ifoSchnelldienst, 2020, 73, Nr. 05, 43-47


**Tab 2.9:** Regional distribution of the wealthiest 10% (10% considered per income)

Source: "Regional Inequality in Germany: Where Do the Rich Live and Where Do the Poor Live?", Lea Immel, Andreas Peichl, ifoInstitut, München, 2020, ifoSchnelldienst, 2020, 73, Nr. 05, 43-47



**Tab 2.10:** Regional distribution of the poorest 40% (40% considered per income)


Source: "Regional Inequality in Germany: Where Do the Rich Live and Where Do the Poor Live?", Lea Immel, Andreas Peichl, ifoInstitut, München, 2020, ifoSchnelldienst, 2020, 73, Nr. 05, 43-47



Looking at the tab (2.9;2.10), it is evident how wealth is distributed in this Member State. If the first map described wealth distribution, considering the richest 10%, in the second, the distribution of wealth considers the poorest 40%. The most known division, that has historical roots btw, is between western and eastern Germany. *“Besonders deutlich sticht der Unterschied zwischen ost- und westdeutschen Kreisen heraus. In Ostdeutschland liegt das Verhältnis – mit der Ausnahme von Berlin und Potsdam – in allen Kreisen unter 1. (...) In Westdeutschland ist der gewichtete Durchschnitt dahingegen deutlich höher. Er beträgt 1,10.”*<sup>26</sup>In western regions wealthiest people are more in bigger cities (Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Köln), but here the situation is particular. In fact, western regions register poverty too, even if not at high levels, in biggest cities areas. The south registers very high level of wealth but also very low levels of poverty. In conclusion, in order to have a complete frame: in the East, there are high levels of poverty and low levels of wealth; in the West, there is a mixed situation, with wealthy people mostly in bigger cities, but a spread level of poverty, not high on qualitative terms; in the South, the situation is the best, registering high levels of wealth and low levels of poverty. In addition to this, income situation has generally worsened, in particular by having in mind the idea of working poor and new poor, when compared to the standard (median) level.

**Tab 2.11:** Income poverty in Germany

Source: <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-what-poverty-looks-like-in-a-rich-country/a-63393501>



<sup>26</sup>“Regional Inequality in Germany: Where Do the Rich Live and Where Do the Poor Live?”, Lea Immel, Andreas Peichl, ifoInstitut, München, 2020, ifoSchnelldienst, 2020, 73, Nr. 05, p.45




Before understanding the next data, a premise is crucial: bigger cities have more tendency to register more crimes than smaller cities. This is the result of multiple reasons, as scientific research describes<sup>27</sup>.

Taking a look at regional data in Germany:

**Tab 2.12:** Regional crime rate in Germany in 2022 (per 100,000 people)

Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1081057/crime-rate-in-germany/>



<sup>27</sup>De Nadai, M., Xu, Y., Letouzé, E. *et al.* Socio-economic, built environment, and mobility conditions associated with crime: a study of multiple cities. *Sci Rep* **10**, 13871 (2020)

If the capital is on the top of the list, two big cities follow Berlin: Bremen and Hamburg, where there is both a presence of wealthy and poor people. Similar situation in the Sachsen-Anhalt, that after the pandemic has registered an increase in terms of poverty.<sup>28</sup> After Sachsen-Anhalt the rank presents firstly North RheinWestfalia, which presents a mixed situation, and then Saarland, where poverty in specific areas reaches relevant levels. Closing the rank with a relevant crime rate, there are three eastern regions: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony. On the opposite side, the only two Bundesländer registering lower levels of crime compared to all the others, are Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria: both correspond to the wealthiest States with lowest levels of poverty.

In conclusion, the frame that comes out, is that fundamentally, where there is poverty there is a certain increase of crimes, even if there is a presence of wealthy groups. In fact, Germany registers spread levels of crime in poorest areas, high levels of crime in biggest cities (even in presence of wealth), and the lowest levels of crime in areas with low levels of poverty and spread wealth.

The other country that will be analyzed in terms of comparison is Italy. Starting with poverty and wealth, even in this case the situation is quite the same. Taking into consideration both absolute and relative poverty, in Italy the frame presents divisions mainly between the North and the South. Starting with **absolute poverty**, considering data of 2022, the difference is relevant. A first couple of data must be taken into account, in order to later understand the entity of differences within the country. Concerning families, the 8.3% (versus the 7.7% of 2021) is in a condition of absolute poverty; in terms of individuals, 9.7% (versus the 9.1% of the previous year) registered the same condition. In the North-West, the incidence of family absolute poverty has been 7.2%, in the North-East 7.9%, in the Centre 6.4%, while in the South 11,2%.

When considering **relative poverty**, the regional difference is even marked. On a national level, the relative poverty in 2022 was quite stable: in terms of families, 10.9% were in relative poverty, while the percentage of individuals was 14.8%.

---


<sup>28</sup> <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/02/01/pove-f01.html>

In regional terms, on the familiar level North registered an incidence of familiar relative poverty of 6.3%, in the Centre 6.5%, while in the South 20.5%. On the individual level, North registered less than 10%, while South 25.3%. Some examples of *regional differences* are quite emblematic: regions such as Calabria and Campania registered respectively the 31.6% and 22.1%, Trentino registered only a 3.8%.

Pandemic has for sure deepened differences, as far as comparing 2020 to 2021, the only area that registered an improvement has been the North: if in 2020 the general incidence of absolute poverty was 9.3%, in one year there has been a 1,1% decrease. This has been highly motivated by the trend –in particular- of two very industrialized areas: north-east and north-west. The former has maintained quite stable its relative poverty incidence rate; the latter has registered a huge increase: from an incidence rate of the 10,1% in 2020 to 9.4% in 2021.<sup>29</sup> Examples of low levels of poverty can be generally found in Northern regions, mostly in the smallest.

**Tab 2.13:** Incidence of familiar relative poverty based on area, 2020-2021 (North-West, North-East, Center, South, Italy)

Source: “Le statistiche dell’Istat sulla povertà | Anno 2022”, Istat, 25.10.2023




Even in this case, there is a clear difference between two areas: a richer north and a poorer south.

<sup>29</sup> “Le statistiche dell’Istat sulla povertà | Anno 2021”, Istat (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica), 15.06.2022

In the Center the situation is more balanced, but even in the Italian case, bigger cities – regardless of the area- present a mixed situation. In most of the cases, in every area there has been an increase of poor families in big cities (here “city” is intended as metropolitan city); the hinterland has generally registered an increase of poor families in particular in the Centre, only the South presents the opposite situation, with less poor families in this period (2005-2015).<sup>30</sup>

**Tab 2.14:** Families living with an income lower than relative poverty threshold

Source: <https://www.openpolis.it/come-sta-cambiando-il-rischio-poverta-nelle-aree-metropolitane/>



In big cities (such as Rome, Milan, Naples, Bologna, Torino, Palermo), because of reasons mentioned before, because of a continuing process of urbanization, people in a condition of relative or absolute poverty are increasing. Evidence in this sense is given by job done by volunteer associations in many realities such as Milan, where 2020 has registered peak of individuals and families assisted for food<sup>31</sup>, or Rome, where already since 2016 poor families are increased, as denounced by CGIL, a national labor union<sup>32</sup>.

As similar as Germany, Italy presents a reality with: wealthy groups in the North, even if in bigger cities register many poor and working poor; a mixed situation in the Centre; spread poverty in the South.

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.openpolis.it/come-sta-cambiando-il-rischio-poverta-nelle-aree-metropolitane/>

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.agenzianova.com/news/crescono-le-poverta-a-milano-in-un-giorno-4600-persone-hanno-chiesto-aiuto-a-pane-quotidiano/>


<sup>32</sup> <https://www.romatoday.it/economia/report-poverta-roma-cgil.html>

In the case of criminality, the situation is more complex. Because of the specific features of criminality in the Italian case, that presents also the presence of high organized criminality, *mafia*, two kind of data, maps, will be used. The first refers to crime rate, considering the number of denunciation.<sup>33</sup> The rank of cities in this terms, presents biggest cities of the Centre and the North: Milan, Rimini, Turin, Bologna, Rome are the first five<sup>34</sup>, and the only city from the South in the top-ten is Naples.

If rank based on denunciations presents this frame, when considering the vulnerability towards organized criminality (mafia), the frame is the opposite, according to Eurispes (2020).<sup>35</sup>

**Tab 2.15:** Regional vulnerability towards organized criminality

Source: <https://eurispes.eu/news/eurispes-risultati-dellindice-di-permeabilita-dei-territori-alla-criminalita-organizzata-ipco/>



Centre and more in particular South have a high level of permeability towards organized criminality, mostly because of economical and social reasons. Of course, organized criminality becomes difficult to understand, because of its nature of

<sup>33</sup> <https://lab24.ilsole24ore.com/indice-della-criminalita/>

<sup>34</sup> <https://lab24.ilsole24ore.com/indice-della-criminalita/indexT.php>

<sup>35</sup> <https://eurispes.eu/news/eurispes-risultati-dellindice-di-permeabilita-dei-territori-alla-criminalita-organizzata-ipco/>

structural organization operating in multiple areas, both legal and illegal, involving not only drugs, prostitution and racket, but also legal businesses (from infrastructure, to energy to environment, to food and tourism). In this context, it becomes difficult to identify the entire criminal network, but of course, thanks to the job of associations, social movements, or institutional bodies (ex. DIA, “Direzione Investigativa Antimafia”), centers of power by criminalized organizations have become known.<sup>36</sup> What comes out is that in areas or regions with low population density and quite spread wealth such as Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the Autonomous Province of Bolzano, but also specific areas in Piedmont or Emilia-Romagna, crime rate is very low, similarly to the Southern part of Germany.

Anyway, the context that comes out is similar to the German one: spread poverty and criminality in the South, both wealth and poverty in the North, mostly in biggest cities, and a balanced situation in wealthy areas and regions, mostly those with less population density.

If the general frame is very similar from a qualitative perspective, the difference between the two countries are quite relevant. On the one hand, when considering crime index on a European level, in geographical terms. In fact, if Italy occupies a high position (11<sup>o</sup>) in the ranking with a crime index of 45.2 in 2022<sup>37</sup>, Germany is in mid-table (21<sup>st</sup>), with a crime index ten points lower ca. (36.4) than Italy.

On the second hand, in the case of safety: Germany is in mid-table (22<sup>nd</sup> position) with a safety index of 63.6, while Italy is in the bottom of the ranking (32<sup>nd</sup>) with a safety index of 54.8). In addition to this, even in the case of organized crime, still the difference is quite significant, especially when comparing specific areas.<sup>38</sup> If the internal frame is quite similar, comparing the countries the situation is quite different: Germany seems, according to data, safer than Italy.

---


<sup>36</sup>Calderoni, Francesco. 2014. “Measuring the Presence of the Mafias in Italy.” In *Organized Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention*, edited by Stefano Caneppele and Francesco Calderoni, 239–49. New York: Springer International Publishing. [http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-01839-3\\_27](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-01839-3_27).

<sup>37</sup> [https://www.numbeo.com/crime/rankings\\_by\\_country.jsp?title=2022&region=150](https://www.numbeo.com/crime/rankings_by_country.jsp?title=2022&region=150)

<sup>38</sup> <https://www.ft.com/content/782f6944-b753-11e4-981d-00144feab7de>

**Tab 2.16:** Organised crime investment hotspots in European regions

Source: <https://www.ft.com/content/782f6944-b753-11e4-981d-00144feab7de>



In conclusion, having in mind two premises (consequences both of a condition of extreme or relative poverty), the German and the Italian frame reveal relevant similarities on qualitative terms (frame). But, in terms of criminality, there are relevant quantitative differences that emerges between the two countries, describing Germany in a better condition.

### 2.3.2. Poverty and political participation: crucial differences

Security and environment are not the only spheres in which poverty plays a crucial role. Looking at the Italian case, even **political participation and democracy** in general is menaced –also- by socioeconomic conditions.

*“As regards the ever-decreasing participation in the vote, our analysis highlighted that abstention is associated with three factors that can be considered three long-term failures of the Italian State: the lack of socio-economic development and security, the persistence of organized crime, and the inability to limit irregular immigration from poor countries. As such, abstention can be considered as a sign of distrust in the Italian*

*political system as a whole, as a “none of the above” vote, and a demand for protection not satisfied by the political offer. (...) We think the most likely outcome will be a further drastic increase in abstention, which could lead to a new unpredictable balance between mainstream and populist parties. The main unknown factor is the possibility that new parties can be formed and stand for election. With a higher abstention, even small shifts in consensus can prove decisive.”<sup>39</sup>*

The lack of socio-economic development is linked to the SDGs aimed at economic growth. Taking into consideration this research, effectively the Italian case presents dangers in terms of democracy and political participation. Looking at data related to political participation, in fact, Italy registers a very bad situation. In the last decade abstention has reached its peak. In 2013 national election it has been 25.8%, in 2018 27.1%, while in the last elections (2022) the abstention has reached the 36.2%.<sup>40</sup> This is mostly originated on the one side by a non-development on socioeconomic terms (as will be demonstrated), and the other side by a worsening of the socioeconomic condition. Even if this century has seen the alternation of different political parties (and as a consequence ideologies, perspectives) in Italy, level of distrust and disinterest are too high and inequality becomes the main explication.<sup>41</sup>

*“Eppure, non sembra affatto questo il caso italiano. Un caso dove il sintomo sembra essere un segnale di una più generale sindrome di allentamento o perdita di legittimità della relazione tra cittadini e istituzioni. Dove alla diminuzione della partecipazione elettorale va aggiunta la crescita della instabilità dei comportamenti di voto, la crescente de-identificazione partitica, la crescita di forme di partecipazione «di protesta», non solo sul fronte dell’exit (voto inespresso), ma anche sul fronte della voce (voto ai partiti di protesta). Dal nostro punto di vista è più probabile che oggi il venir meno del prendere parte costituisca l’aspetto forse più appariscente della crisi della politica nelle società democratiche contemporanee. Più difficile spiegarne le*

---

<sup>39</sup>“Abstention and Populist Voting: Evidence from the Italian 2018 Election”, L. DallaPellegrina, G. Di Maio, M. Gilli, Center for European Studies, Paper series, no.503 sept.2022

<sup>40</sup> <https://www.econopoly.ilsole24ore.com/2022/11/04/elezioni-voto-cambiamento/>

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2020/number/1/article/italy-s-political-upheaval-and-the-consequences-of-inequality.html>



*ragioni. Da un lato, si parla di astensionismo da apatia, cioè da distanza fra l'elettore e l'offerta politica, questo tipo di astensionismo «ha le sue radici nella posizione di marginalità che la politica occupa nell'orizzonte psicologico di molti elettori delle moderne democrazie di massa come testimoniano numerose e ben documentate ricerche» (Sani, 2000, 842). Dall'altro lato, si parla di astensionismo di protesta, come espressione attiva di una insoddisfazione dell'elettore, che esprime «un consenso esplicitamente negato, una dimostrazione di sfiducia e in molti casi di aperta ostilità verso la sfera della politica e, in particolar modo, nei confronti della classe politica» (Sani, 2000, 844).»<sup>42</sup>*

Germany, on the opposite does not register these levels of decrease in terms of political participation: its historical minimum result, in 2009, does anyway register a participation higher than 70%. Italy represents the most emblematic case in Europe in which distrust in government and politics in general is manifested by a strong decrease of political participation. Even if general indicators -such as GDP, industrial production, employment level- suggest a stable situation, indicators concerning socioeconomic conditions express the sphere in which Italy has registered the hardest worsening.

### *2.3.3. Poverty, environment and SDGs*

A condition of spread poverty (in general terms), involves social, economic consequences also for a State and not only for individuals or society. When considering security, of course contrasting, facing criminal phenomena involves economic and human resources that need to be employed by a State: as a consequence, this constitute an overall coast in general terms, that will be higher or lower depending on the qualitative situation. Taking the example of Germany and Italy, Italy needs more resources (general terms) to face specific phenomena, also on a local level, because of the entity, the nature of crime in the Italian case. This creates obstacles in terms of development, both on national and regional, local terms. Another field linked not only

---

<sup>42</sup>Maurizio Cerruto, «La partecipazione elettorale in Italia», *Quaderni di Sociologia*, 60 | 2012, 17-39. <https://journals.openedition.org/qds/537#text>

to the issue in question –poverty, labour market -, but also to the mentioned UN but also EU aims for the future, is environment, as well-known.

From a political-historical point of view, one of the first moments in which it has been understood the linkage between environment and poverty, has been with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), agreed by UN Member States (2000); in fact, *“MDGs formally accepted that some environmental factors should be captured in poverty assessments. However, environmental sustainability and hazards such as pollution from chemicals, waste, and motor vehicle emissions were not adequately reflected.”*<sup>43</sup> Then, the 2020 UNDP Human Development Report, and the Agenda 2030, 2050, have increasingly brought attention on the importance of poverty and environment, posing aims concerning the importance of safe water, food, environment in general for a sustainable development. On a global level, this century marks the fight against poverty and global warming, for a gross social development. When considering society and environment, some statistics are relevant, taking always in mind the comparison between Germany and Italy.

When considering environmental aims on a medium-term, two are significant in this comparison. Firstly, the 2030 aim to have at least 30 million electric cars.<sup>44</sup> Considering this aim, a comparison on electric vehicle in Germany and Italy is crucial to understand the importance of the role of the State.

In the case of electric vehicles, the difference seems relevant between the two countries.


---

<sup>43</sup> Brief #11, “Merging the Poverty and Environment Agendas”, Delia Paul, feb 2021, IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development), pp 2-3

<sup>44</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_22\\_6462](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_6462)


**Tab 2.17:** Number of electronic cars per 100.000 people

Source: <https://landgeist.com/2021/01/29/electric-cars/>



**Tab 2.18:** New electric vehicles by country (2019)

Source: [https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/new-registrations-of-electric-vehicles#:~:text=Germany%2C%20France%20and%20Norway%20together,%25\)%20and%20Finland%20\(20%25\)](https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/new-registrations-of-electric-vehicles#:~:text=Germany%2C%20France%20and%20Norway%20together,%25)%20and%20Finland%20(20%25))



The proportion shown by the two images described a very different situation between the two countries.

In particular, the graph 2.15 represents the number of electric vehicles sold in 2022.

*“In 2022, the share of electric vehicles in new car registrations increased in almost all countries (EU-27, Iceland, Norway) compared with 2021. The highest shares were found in Norway (89%), Sweden (58%) and Iceland (56%). Germany, France and Norway together accounted for about 64% of all new BEV registrations among the EU-27 and non-EU EEA countries. Norway had the highest number of new BEVs registered in 2022, accounting for 79% of new car sales. PHEV percentage sales were highest in Iceland, Sweden (both 23%) and Finland (20%).”<sup>45</sup>*

Taking into account the States mentioned, it is important to underline how on the one side State intervention has been relevant<sup>(46, 47)</sup>. Sweden, the other European country on the top of the list, decided in 2022 to end incentives for electric vehicles.<sup>48</sup> Taking into account general data mentioned until now, those States where electric vehicles have been more sold were also those countries with higher salaries<sup>49</sup>. Having in mind this data and this differences (also in economical terms) and considering that in this moment it is economically harder to buy electric vehicles<sup>50</sup>, differences become an obvious result, demonstrating how economy (individual, familiar level), politics (role of the State) and environment are strictly linked; in particular, poverty –both absolute and relative- can influence specific spheres, such as this one. Another example could be done with energy, and the diffusion of sustainable houses.

---

<sup>45</sup>[https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/new-registrations-of-electric-vehicles#:~:text=Germany%2C%20France%20and%20Norway%20together,%25\)%20and%20Finland%20\(20%25\)](https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/new-registrations-of-electric-vehicles#:~:text=Germany%2C%20France%20and%20Norway%20together,%25)%20and%20Finland%20(20%25))

<sup>46</sup><https://elbil.no/english/norwegian-ev-policy/>

<sup>47</sup><https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/11/28/the-ev-market-is-booming-in-iceland-can-the-rest-of-europe-catch-up>


<sup>48</sup><https://www.electrive.com/2022/11/08/sweden-drops-ev-subsidies-with-immediate-effect/>

<sup>49</sup><https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20221219-3>

<sup>50</sup><https://www.ft.com/content/a7e58ce7-4fab-424a-b1fa-f833ce948cb7>

**Tab 2.19:** Electric car sales and national income

Source: <https://www.acea.auto/press-release/electric-cars-lower-income-countries-fall-behind-with-uptake-linked-to-gdp-per-capita/>



On the one side, of course, when talking about environment, the role of the State is crucial; on the other side, also the context must be taken into consideration. In fact, in countries –such as Italy- where income are lower, and poverty is spread in many areas, enforcing labour and welfare policies becomes crucial from a wider perspective, taking into account the positive consequences that the same may have also in other spheres (security, environment).

In addition to this, it has been understood poverty does affect environment. Many researches by demonstrate how growing inequality influences environment, stopping a sustainable development (<sup>51</sup>, <sup>52</sup>, <sup>53</sup>).


<sup>51</sup>“Environmental degradation and poverty: A bibliometric review”, Muhammad Ali Khan Burki , Umar Burki , Usama Najam, “Regional sustainability” Volume 2, Issue 4, October 2021

<sup>52</sup>Ruesga-Benito, S.M.; González-Laxe, F.; Picatoste, X. Sustainable Development, Poverty, and Risk of Exclusion for Young People in the European Union: The Case of NEETs. *Sustainability* **2018**, *10*, 4708. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124708>

<sup>53</sup>“Impact of poverty and income inequality on the ecological footprint in Asian developing economies: Assessment of Sustainable Development Goals”, Salim Khan, Wang Yahong, AsmaZeeshan, Energy reports 8 (2022), 670-679

This is super clear when comparing the two countries in terms of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Looking at the “Europe Sustainable Development Report 2022”, differences are very evident:


**Tab 2.20:** Halfway into the SDGs, progress towards targets varies across European countries and goals  
 Source: Lafortune, G., Fuller, G., Bermont Diaz, L., Kloke-Lesch, A., Koundouri, P., Riccaboni, A. (2022). Achieving the SDGs: Europe’s Compass in a Multipolar World. Europe Sustainable Development Report 2022. SDSN and SDSN Europe. France: Paris.



If Germany is part of Western Europe and Italy of Southern Europe, the difference is very clear, with the former more similar to Northern Europe (countries such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden, where poverty –both absolute and relative- registers lowest rates), while the latter ranked under the EU average. As a consequence, when considering Europe and not EU, Germany occupies the 6<sup>th</sup> place with a SDG index score of 74.8, while Italy is 19<sup>th</sup> in the ranking with an index of 70.6. Looking at the performance per sustainable goal:

**Tab 2.21:** The 2022 SDG Dashboards by country and sub-regions

Source: Europe Sustainable Development Report 2022, Achieving the SDGs: Europe’s Compass in a Multipolar World, UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN)



Comparing Germany and Italy, what comes out is the difference in the case of: *No poverty, Zero Hunger, Clean water and sanitation, Decent work and economic growth*. The last aim, more in particular is: *Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all*. It refers to targets related to full employment, youth employment, equality, labour rights. Taking into account specific indicators, SDGs have specific parameters for each country. In the case of Germany and Italy, goals such as *Sustainable cities and communities, Responsible consumption and production* are proof the good job done by Italy so far. Instead, concerning the 4 previous mentioned goals, the situation is different, respectively: in the case of poverty, Germany has a minimum level of attention on it, and situation is *stagnating*; in the case of Italy, even if situation in this sense is *moderately increasing*, poverty still remains a *significant* challenge. Hunger remains a major challenge for both, but Germany is moderately improving its situation. Clean water and sanitation concerns targets involving the chance for everyone of having access to clean water, equitable sanitation and hygiene for all, but also a correct use of water (both from a quantitative and qualitative point of view) and the preservation of ecosystems that from pollution. In this case, if Germany can consider this as a basic challenge and is working well on this target, Italy must consider this as a significant challenge and is not improving its situation.

In the end, decent work and economic growth registers a Germany that still considers this target as a challenge but is working to reach the target, while Italy is in a worse condition, doing not too much in this terms, even if this goals constitutes a *significant challenge*.

When considering environment and sustainability in general terms, the difference between Germany and Italy is evident, demonstrating how countries with spread wealth and less poverty are nearer to SDGs, independently from their GDP.



# CHAPTER 3: MINIMUM SALARY AND UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME: CRUCIAL MEANS TOWARDS A SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY?

## Introduction

The frame described in the previous chapters shows the importance of adapting welfare and labour policies according to the context and both to supra-national and global aims. Different measures in this sense are at the center of the debate nowadays: some already adopted, but still discussed in many countries, others are totally new. The next chapter will focus on the minimum salary and the universal basic income. The minimum salary has been at the centre of the debate of the political arena in Italy, where the question of salaries is crucial, having in mind the fact that, compared to other EU member States, in Italy salaries haven't raised. Different political and social actors consider it a relevant tool to improve both labour and socioeconomic conditions of workers, but the debate is still open; in other EU countries, minimum salary is a long-used tool, but Italy is not the only member State that has not already adopted it. On the other hand, the universal basic income has been not already implemented on a national scale. On the academic and social level, many are raising the importance of considering it as a very efficient tool, and in some cases there are pilot projects.

### 3.1. The minimum wage

As said before, minimum salary is already active in many EU countries, on the opposite of the universal basic income. In fact, minimum wage has a long history if compared to UBI. On a global level, a first appearance of the minimum wage has been registered in New Zealand. In the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Parliament passed the *Industrial*


*Conciliation and Arbitration Act*. Even if the aim was to solve industrial issues, the act created the conditions for establishing a system that would enable a minimum wage. This was followed, two years later, by the *Wages Board Law (1896)*, a law aimed at fixing a legal minimum wage, promulgated in Victoria, an Australian State. After WWI it's the turn of other Commonwealth countries: Canada and USA. In the former case, the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba decided in 1918 to set a minimum wage for specific categories and jobs: this decision was followed by more other provinces. The latter saw the first application of minimum wage in 1912, thanks to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Only under Roosevelt, a federal minimum wage has been established. After WWII minimum wage became globally quite spread (often being initially adopted for specific categories, industries, jobs): in South America, after Mexico (1937) and Brazil (1938), also Colombia (1955) and Argentina (1964) adopted this tool. More other relevant cases are India (1948) and Pakistan (1961). In Europe, one of the first countries to implement a similar measure has been France, in 1950, with the *Salaire Minimum National Interprofessionnel Garanti (SMIG)*, which became the SMIC (*Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance*) in 1970. Other countries launching legislations on national minimal wage quite early have been Belgium (1968), Netherlands (1969), Bulgaria (1966) and Poland (1970). In Southern Europe, Portugal saw its introduction in 1974, as a product of the Carnation Revolution; in Spain, a form of minimal wage was already adopted under Franco's regime (1963), and it has been reformed and adopted with the restoration of democracy in 1980; in the end, Greece saw a longstanding history that registered different changes since. Europe does now register minimum wage in 22 of the 27 Member States: exceptions are represented by Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Finland and Italy.

### *3.1.1. Minimum wage in the EU*

As mentioned before, in the EU, most of the Member States have already implemented the minimum wage.

**Tab 3.1:** Minimum wages, July 2023 and July 2013 (levels, in € per month and average annual growth, in %)

Source: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Minimum wages, July 2023 and July 2013 \(levels, in € per month and average annual growth, in %25\) .png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Minimum_wages,_July_2023_and_July_2013_(levels,_in_%E2%82%AC_per_month_and_average_annual_growth,_in_%25).png)



Note: Denmark, Italy, Austria, Finland and Sweden have no national minimum wage.

(\*) July 2013 data and average annual rate of change not available.

(?) Minimum wage in force on 1 July 2021

Source: Eurostat (online data code: *earn\_mw\_cur*)

eurostat

Countries without minimum wage are: Denmark, Italy, Austria, Finland and Sweden. Here, minimum wage is agreed and protected by collective agreements with trade unions. The range in terms of minimum wage among member states is quite wide: from €399 of Bulgaria to €2508 of Luxembourg, demonstrating the wide differences between EU countries in socioeconomic terms.

EU, in terms of minimum wage, has quite recently worked on it, by developing a directive in 2022: the EU Directive on adequate minimum wages. The decision has been particularly taken in light of high inflation, war in Ukraine, and covid and post-covid economic difficulties. The aim of the Directive is having adequate salaries in every EU country. In the case of countries without minimum wage, collective agreements should play a relevant role; in this case, reports and high levels of cooperation with the EU are required. Furthermore, during negotiations between working people representatives and employers' organizations, the main terms to establish are: pay, benefits, hours, leave, safety policies and job health. Member States, in order to set an adequate minimum wage, can choose between two tools: establish a basket of goods and services at real prices or set the minimum wage to, at least, the 60% of gross median wage and 50% of gross average wage. The directive aims at enforcing the collective bargaining coverage, considering that member countries with high coverage tend to have less low-wage workers. In fact, according to the directive, Member States where less than 80% of workers is covered by collective bargaining, will have to set an action plan with a clear timeline and a set of measures aimed at increasing the coverage. In addition to this, the directive focuses also on the qualitative aspect, by indicating some issues that Member States will have to monitor: abusive sub-contracting, bogus self-employment, non-recorded overtime, increased work intensity. Member States are asked to report to the Commission, every two years, level of developments in this terms. In conclusion, EU countries have two years to transpose the directive from its adoption (October 2022).

### *3.1.2. Some effects of the minimum wage: a focus on Germany*

As far as minimum wage has been adopted, some of its effects can be identified. The focus in this section will be Germany: more in particular some effects identified after the adoption of the measure. Before deepening the focus on Germany, on the EU level it is evident how socioeconomic frames are very different. In fact, looking at those countries who do have a minimum wage, and those who do not, some first general aspects are interesting.

Starting from countries that have not adopted yet the measure, a common aspect is evident: they are mostly States with low levels of poverty, high level of employment, and also with lower negative conditions in terms of social exclusion. Among the five countries without a minimum wage, four do register good socioeconomic conditions: Austria, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Taking into consideration data of the 1<sup>st</sup> chapter, these countries register low percentages of individuals at risk of poverty or social exclusion; they register low percentage both of absolute and relative poverty; they mostly have low levels of youth unemployment. These countries do present a condition in which there are also low levels of working poor. The only country that differs in this terms is Italy: as seen in chapter two, there are many negative socioeconomic data. What can be found in common between the other countries, always considering the socioeconomic sphere, is a high level of welfare: high levels of protection towards poor, great attention on income equality, strong social security systems. Summing up, a first point can be understood: even without a minimum wage, countries with high levels of social protection and great attention on income equality, do register good performances on socioeconomic terms.

On the contrary, considering also the quantity (more than twenty countries), the situation is very differentiated within those countries that have already implemented a minimum wage. Having understood the German socioeconomic situation in the second chapter, and having noticed a first starting point in the general evaluation of a comparison between the efficiency of minimum wage or UBI, it is interesting to look at some effects of the measure in Germany, where it has been introduced in 2015, with a minimum wage of €8.50/hour. In 2022 the minimum wage was also widely risen up, being set at €12.50/hour. Of course, there have been different opinions on it, between who did not share the measure, having doubts on the possible consequences for employment, and who supported its adoption, believing in the positive effects of it. According to researches on the effects of minimum wage in this country, the frame is more complex. A first point, concerns employment. Even if there were bad perspectives with huge costs in terms of employment, research does not find out the consequences imagined before, which expected a high number of job losses (<sup>54</sup>).


---

<sup>54</sup> Knabe, A., R. Schöb, M. Thum (2014). Der flächendeckende Mindestlohn. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 15(2): 133-157

Instead, the impact has been generally neutral. In fact, it has been quite positive, registering continuous creation of jobs, without negative contraction during the first years since its adoption. More in particular there is evidence that it also depends on the kind of sector. For example, it is evident how in specific sectors, the measure could negatively influence employment levels (<sup>55</sup>). Generally speaking, minimum wage has not shown bad consequences on German employment. Instead, Germany has continued its positive development in terms of employment rate, as clear from the *tab 3.2*, but of course it is not evident if minimum wage has positively influenced this trend.

**Tab 3.2:** Employment rate in Germany (2010-2021, %)

Source: <https://www.globaldata.com/data-insights/macroeconomic/employment-rate-in-germany-2137607/#:~:text=Germany%20had%20an%20employment%20rate%20of%2075.8%25%20in%202021.,the%20indicator%20increased%20by%207.8%25>



The most positive effects of the minimum wage have been mostly on qualitative terms. Firstly, in terms of *low-wage workers*. Evidence shows positive effect, of around 8% increase<sup>56</sup>, on monthly wages of low-wage workers. Researches do usually suggest a lower entity of the effect, which, in any case is positive, giving more economic power to this kind of workers. Another benefit concerns also the personal sphere of the

<sup>55</sup> Heise, Arne; Pusch, Toralf (2018) :Introducingminimumwages in Germany: Employmenteffects in a postKeynesianperspective, ZÖSS Discussion Paper, No. 68, Universität Hamburg, Zentrum für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien (ZÖSS), Hamburg

<sup>56</sup>C. Ohlert, Effects of the German minimum wage on earnings and working time using establishment data, 1.Auflage. Dortmund: Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin, 2022

individual. In fact, it has been registered, a decrease of *working hours*, with workers working less but earning something more or, the same: of course, this is explained by the fact that, after the adoption of the measure, there has been an increase of labour costs for employers. A negative dynamic observed<sup>57</sup>, in terms of working hours and *monthly wage*, is when comparing some kind of average- and low-income workers wage with the past. In many cases (depending on the sector, but also on other variables such as geographical region), it has been registered quite no change, or even a decrease: this is explained by the decision of employers to reduce working hours. Furthermore, there is to consider the impact on poverty and welfare. In terms of welfare, work benefit payments have been reduced. On the other side<sup>58</sup>, it has been noticed how benefits were reduced mostly for marginal employment (minijobs<sup>59</sup> in particular, intended as jobs with low wages, low working hours and a short period of working), but at the same time added in some cases for regular employments. Minimum wage has had good consequences in terms of inequality reducing in particular wage inequality.<sup>60</sup> In brief, minimum wage has been able to lower working poor's dependency on welfare<sup>61</sup>.

In terms of poverty, results have been less positive. In fact, results must be distinguished between pre-market and post-market condition. In terms of the latter, as seen, minimum wage has had mostly positive effects, in particular on low-wage workers. In terms of pre-market, the effects have been more neutral. In fact, there have not been particularly exhaustive effects in terms of poverty. In fact, influence of minimum wage on the incidence of poverty has been neutral. In fact, firstly, minimum wage does not involve a very consistent part of workers: in particular, self-employed workers, which remain out from the benefit. Second, unemployed individuals are not

---

<sup>57</sup> Marco Caliendo & Carsten Schröder & Linda Wittbrodt, 2019. "[The Causal Effects of the Minimum Wage Introduction in Germany – An Overview](#)," [German Economic Review](#), Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 20(3), pages 257-292

<sup>58</sup> Bruckmeier, K. and Becker, S. (2018). Auswirkung des Mindestlohns auf die Armutsgefährdung und die Lage von erwerbstätigen Arbeitslosengeld II-Bezieherinnen und -Beziehern, Studie im Auftrag der Mindestlohnkommission, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg

<sup>59</sup> <https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/lexikon/minijob>

<sup>60</sup> Bruttel O., Baumann A. & Dütsch M. (2018) The new German statutory minimum wage in comparative perspective: Employment effects and other adjustment channels. *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 24 (2) 145–162.

<sup>61</sup> Schmitz, S. (2017). The effects of Germany's new minimum wage on employment and welfare dependency, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics, Discussion Paper 2017/21.

concerned by the minimum wage and, at the same time, the measure does not create conditions for creating occupation; instead, depending on the sector and on the area, there is the risk to lose job places, even if, on the whole, there are no negative effects on employment.

In conclusion, the effects of the minimum wage have been noticed mostly in terms of working poor, and, more specifically, low-wage workers, who have been able to get a better and more median economic condition after the introduction of the measure.

### *3.1.3. A first balance on minimum wage*

Starting from the German example, literature presents similar effects also on general terms when talking about minimum wage. There is accordance in fact, in affirming the positive effects of the measure on low-wage workers. General accordance concerns also the neutral effect on employment, without the extremely negative effects that have been announced in many countries before the adoption of the measure. At the same time, it is not an efficient tool to face poverty, not reaching specific vulnerable groups in poverty such as members of households with low work intensity, unemployed, individual out of a condition of working age. Summing up, minimum wage is relevant in improving conditions of many low wage workers. Conditions linked to inequality in terms of education, social, and economic context, need to be adjusted through other means, that could be adopted together with the minimum wage. In addition to this, most vulnerable groups still need a strong welfare. Of course, when looking at working poor, minimum wage, on the EU level, can help a lot. In particular, taking into account the adjustments done by Germany, based on living costs, inflation, and more other variables, this measure becomes more relevant.



## 3.2. The Universal Basic Income: an introduction

On the other side, the other tool that will be analyzed is the **Universal Basic Income (UBI)**. Differently from the minimal wage, UBI represents a long-standing idea that now is reaching importance not only on the academic but also on the political level. Across history, there are many examples of it: from the Roman Empire until now, examples of countries and thinkers raising importance on this issue (of a universal benefit, depending on the historical context) are a lot. Other examples are Thomas More and Luis Vives. The former imagined and described a society in which institution granted a minimum condition to every individual; the latter, a philosopher, imagined a proposed a real welfare scheme according to which every citizen was entitled to a minimum subsistence. Across the centuries, many other thinkers supported an idea of basic subsistence for everyone, in different forms, often linked to an idea of basic elements such as land and food: from Thomas Payne to Charles Fourier. Since the origins of structured societies, the idea of a universal benefit has been spread. Moving a step forward, if this issue has raised agendas in USA during the 60's, in Europe some of the most important debates became spread in Center and Northern Europe. In particular: in Denmark, a group of academics defended the proposal of an UBI (called by them *citizen's wage*) in the book *Revolt from the Center* (1978); Netherlands saw a relevant debate. Starting from researches of Jan Pieter Kuiper (who claimed the importance of a similar measure for health purposes), the PPR party (*Politieke Partij Radicalen*), was the first European party with parliamentary representation having this point in its electoral program. On a European level, the first event on UBI was held in Belgium in 1986. This gave origin to different groups pushing for raising the importance of UBI on the social and political agenda; networks have been created around the world on different levels (national, supra-national, in the case of EU).



Actually, there are many pilot projects around the world and in Europe, testing the effects of this measure, as will be analyzed in the next section. As said, even if this measure is long-standing on a theoretical level; efficient tests, experiments are done now, also because of the strong need to pursue a social sustainability, that, as already seen, figures out fight against poverty in favour of more equality.

### 3.2.1. UBI on the theoretical level

With Universal Basic Income, it is generally intended the measure which expects to give the same economic benefit to every individual, without any condition, independently from any kind of status (social, economic, ecc...). This is the base of the concept, but of course, there are different kind of perspectives. It is viewed on the one side as a measure that should be included with other existing welfare benefits, while on the other side it is thought as the measure that could replace welfare. There are also debates even in terms of beneficiaries, with some questioning the universality of the measure. Some of the main features of the UBI can be identified: “**Universal**: It is paid to every individual and not targeted to a specific population; **unconditional**: it involves no set conditions or sanctions and is given to those who are both employed and unemployed, voluntarily or not; **cash payment**: it is paid in cash, which allows recipients to convert their benefits however they choose; **individual**: it is paid on an individual basis (versus household-based); **Periodic**: It is a recurring payment rather than a one-off grant”<sup>62</sup>.

Starting from this base, it is possible to identify some among the arguments in favour or against the measure. The former refers mostly to poverty and equality. Among the arguments in favour of UBI there is a concept of *freedom*, which finds its roots especially in political philosophy. Among the concept at the base of freedom in this sense, there is the idea that, thanks to UBI, an individual can better rationally act, without having financial complains, having a wider availability of choices (in terms of education, work, life in general). This is embodied in the concept of *real freedom* by

---

<sup>62</sup>Hasdell, R. (2020) What we know about Universal Basic Income: A cross-synthesis of reviews. Stanford, CA: Basic Income Lab.

Van Parijs<sup>63</sup>, which is included in an approach towards social justice. Economic freedom is seen as a mean for having a general freedom. Another interesting concept based on freedom deriving from a universal income is presented by one of the earliest proponents of a universal income: Erich Fromm. As the academic argued, “A guaranteed income, which becomes possible in the era of economic abundance, could for the first time free man from the threat of starvation, and thus make him truly free and independent from any economic threat. Nobody would have to accept conditions of work merely because he otherwise would be afraid of starving- a talented or ambitious man or woman could learn new skills to prepare himself or herself for a different kind of occupation. A woman could leave her husband, an adolescent his family. People would learn to be no longer afraid, if they did not have to fear hunger. (This holds true, of course, only if there is also no political threat that inhibits man’s free thought, speech, and action.) Guaranteed income would not only establish freedom as a reality rather than a slogan, it would also establish a principle deeply rooted in Western religious and humanist tradition: man has the right to live, regardless! This right to live, to have food, shelter, medical care, education, etc., is an intrinsic human right that cannot be restricted by any condition, not even the one that he must be socially „useful.“ The shift from a psychology of scarcity to that of abundance is one of the most important steps in human development. A psychology of scarcity produces anxiety, envy, egotism (to be seen most drastically in peasant cultures all over the world). A psychology of abundance produces initiative, faith in life ‘solidarity. The fact is that most men are still geared psychologically to the economic facts of scarcity, when the industrial world is in the process of entering a new era of economic abundance.”<sup>64</sup> Another argument in favour of UBI refers to poverty, which is one of the fundamental pillars of UBI’s proponents. In fact, setting a UBI above the poverty line, together with progressive taxation, would lead to an elimination of absolute poverty. In terms of families, it could create the conditions to invest in education and in human capital in general, without remaining trapped into economic difficulties that would influence rational choices in terms of investments. Then, in a perspective of –a quite-

---

<sup>63</sup>Parijs, Philippe Van, *Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?* (Oxford, 1997; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 Nov. 2003)

<sup>64</sup> Fromm, E. (1966). *The Psychological Aspects of the Guaranteed Income*. In R. Theobald, *The Guaranteed Income*. New York: Doubleday & Co.

total substitution of welfare measures, it would also reduce administrative and bureaucracies' complexities and costs (here "a guaranteed national income" is intended as general concept to identify those set of measures, such as UBI, promoting a universal approach): *"First, a guaranteed national income would be simpler and far more transparent than the current welfare bureaucracy. It could result in substantial administrative savings, while allowing for greater oversight. It would also help break up the entrenched constituencies that support the welfare state."*<sup>65</sup> In addition to this, a universal income would be efficient in reaching every vulnerable group, differently from ad hoc welfare measures targeting specific groups<sup>66</sup>. In terms of gender equality, there are different perspectives. Proponents consider it as a way to enforce women independence, taking into account the importance of economic independence. They look also at the influence of an eventual cash transfer in terms of gender equality, avoiding dynamics of unpaid, low-paid jobs, and labour market dynamics linked to black labour market, or even labour exploitation. Opponents do have mostly doubts on the source of resources that should be spent, having doubts in terms of other services; according to the latter in fact, the risk is to see many public services (from health to education, to labour welfare) that would be inefficient, creating new needs and problems.

On the other side, there are some doubts shared by opponents of UBI. The main argument against the UBI concerns financial issue. In fact, if on the one side there are doubts in terms of how to finance the measure (which would have of course a cost, translated into cuts on welfare or other spheres), on the other side doubts concern the cost-ineffective results that could be followed by the measure. This last aspect concerns in particular the capacity to identify the perfect level on which a universal basic income should be set, as far as a very low UBI would be useless, while a too high basic income would be both not practical on the medium term and could have negative influences on the economy<sup>67</sup>. Furthermore, troubles refer also to the adoption of an adequate taxation system, in presence of the measure, taking into

---

<sup>65</sup> Tanner, M. (2015). *The Pros and Cons of a Guaranteed National Income*. Policy Analysis No. 773: Cato Institute

<sup>66</sup>Perkiö, J. (2014). *Universal Basic Income: A New Tool for Development Policy?* Kansainvalinen Solidaarisuutyo: International Security Work

<sup>67</sup> Fitzpatrick, T. (1999). *Freedom and Security: An Introduction to the Basic Income Debate*. London: Macmillan Press

account eventual effects on employment. Other concerns are linked to the basic concept of universal income, posing the attention on the necessity of finding a balance between rights and duties: this argument is embodied in the “*reciprocity objection*”<sup>68</sup>. In conclusion, arguments against the UBI refer mostly to the economic and financial sphere, especially by considering the different perspectives –and the consequent doubts- on how it should be adopted.

After having understood what is UBI and which are the main pros and cons moved on the academic level, it is important to deepen the issue in order to understand the eventual practical effects. Before looking at some projects, a research that based on many global studies is useful in starting to understand the eventual effects of the measure. A very interesting research<sup>69</sup> conducted by the Stanford Basic Income Lab, evaluated a theoretical impact of the UBI through a synthesis of many reviews. Most of the reviews are based on middle- and low-income countries, but high-income countries’ reports and dynamics have been included too. The synthesis considers, depending on the area, some of the most important studies in terms of universal cash transfers and its real effects. In this section, results that will be reported will refer to middle and advanced economies, in order to consider those results in the realm of those economies most similar to the EU countries. Taking into consideration the impact of the measure per area, some common effects identified can be shown. In terms of individual poverty, there is a minimum positive impact in terms of decrease of it. Effects are most neutral in terms of household income and household poverty. Furthermore, there is a general increase in terms of households’ expenditure, but neutral effects in terms of savings. In terms of employment, there have not been negative indications: in fact, most of the reviews have shown neutral or positive effects on work participation. This must be contextualized, as far as there have been decrease of work participation by specific social groups: for example, many studies conducted in the USA, observe decrease of working hours for young mothers in particular. Generally speaking, there have not been indications on less labour market participation, even if effects on the long term are not known. Very good effects have been observed in

---

<sup>68</sup> MCKINNON, CATRIONA. “Basic Income, Self-Respect and Reciprocity.” *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2003, pp. 143–58. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24355019>

<sup>69</sup> Hasdell, R. (2020) What we know about Universal Basic Income: A cross-synthesis of reviews. Stanford, CA: Basic Income Lab.

terms of education. In fact, investments in education result higher, especially when considering low-income families. Good effects have been registered in terms of mental health. In conclusion, summing up, *“findings are generally positive that UBI type programs alleviate poverty and improve health and education outcomes and that the effects on labor market participation are minimal”*<sup>70</sup>. The main challenges and doubts refer to the nature of the UBI as a measure, more in particular: how taxation would change and which cuts will allow the adoption of the measure (and which would be consequences deriving from those cuts).

### *3.2.2. UBI, a practical perspective: work in progress? Pilot projects and experiments*

The aim of this section is to understand on a practical level the entity of this measure. In fact, there are many projects around the world, trying to understand both the impact on the long-term and how to ameliorate the measure. Projects in terms of universal income have been developed also in the past, but nowadays, thanks to the better possibilities to efficiently collect data, experiments are better formulated. A strong premise must be done: there has not been a concrete *universal* project involving an entire nation. Furthermore, even on the local level the experiment has been anyway conscripted, on social terms. For this reason, it can be useful to understand the entity of the measure in this sense –concrete experiments- by starting from the most important project on a global level, which follows projects in Europe. The way experiments have been implemented and the impact –were data are available- they had, will be relevant in understanding the nature of the measure and its possible contribution to social sustainability.

The first experiment that will be presented is one of the biggest projects worldwide: the ***Kenyan experiment***. In 2017, the program, conducted by the US NGO *Give directly*, started in enlarging cash payments in Siaya and Bomet counties, characterized by very high levels of poverty. The amount of the benefit is \$0.75 per day. This means a

---

<sup>70</sup>Hasdell, R. (2020) What we know about Universal Basic Income: A cross-synthesis of reviews. Stanford, CA: Basic Income Lab.

monthly payment of \$22.50/month, crucial in Kenya, where the extreme poverty line is at <\$33/month but given in different ways. In fact, different groups were created, in order to understand the different effects:

*“• Control: 100 villages (approximately 11,000 people) received no transfers.*

*• Long-term UBI: in 44 villages (approximately 5,000 people) each adult over the age of 18 receives US \$0.75 nominal per day, or \$1.88 PPP, delivered in monthly installments for 12 years. We calculated this amount as sufficient to cover the most basic needs, such as basic staple food consumption, and perhaps some health and education. In addition, teenagers aged 15-17 in long-term villages were told that they would begin receiving transfers upon turning 18.*

*• Short-term UBI: in 80 villages (approximately 8,800 people) each adult over the age of 18 receives transfers as in the long-term arm, but for only 2 years.*

*• Lump-sum cash transfer: in 71 villages (approximately 8800 people) each adult over the age of 18 received a one-time payment of about US \$500 nominal, or \$1250 PPP. (In practice GD delivered this amount in two equally sized installments two months apart, in order to fit within M-PESA transaction limits.) The lump-sum transfers was thus the equivalent in net present value terms of the short-term transfers discounted at an annual rate of 8%.”<sup>71</sup>*

---

<sup>71</sup>Universal Basic Income: Short-Term Results from a Long-Term Experiment in Kenya, Suri et. al (2023)

**Tab. 3.3:** Experiment in Kenya: groups and payments

Source: <https://www.givedirectly.org/2023-ubi-results/>

	2018	2020	2025	2030
	Baseline survey	(This paper from this survey) Recipients surveyed	Next survey**	Final survey
<b>Long-term UBI</b>	12-years start \$22.50 given monthly	<b>Total given: \$540</b>	Total given: \$1,890	Total given: \$3,240
<b>Short-term UBI</b>	2-years start \$22.50 given monthly	<b>Total given: \$540</b>	Total given: \$540	Total given: \$540
<b>Large lump sum</b>	\$500 given once*	<b>Total given: \$500</b>	Total given: \$500	Total given: \$500
<b>Control</b>	No payment	<b>Total given: \$0</b>	Total given: \$0	Total given: \$0

This is very important to understand which could be the best implementation of the measure, also depending on the context. The research, conducted on the first two years of the experiment, shows some interesting results.

In fact, it has been observed how long-term monthly payments do favor a general economic expansion, with more savings, but also more self-employment, with investments in businesses. Furthermore, labour supply has not been affected, registering in some case even an increase. Large lump-sum payments have registered the best results, similar to long-term UBI, and even better in some areas. On the other side, short-term payments have registered less good results than the former, registering a good level of consumption but very low rates in terms of savings and self-employment. A long-term approach has generally shown better results.



**Tab. 3.4:** Long-term UBI, short-term UBI & large lump sum after 2 years


Source: <https://www.givedirectly.org/2023-ubi-results/>



In conclusion, very good effects have been registered in terms of consumption, education (more expenditures in schooling), hunger, but also physical and mental healthiness. Furthermore, more businesses have been opened, and no negative effects on labour supply and inflation have been registered. Of course, in the next years, long-term results will be more crucial.

Before entering the European context, a long-standing project, still ongoing, is relevant on the theoretical and academic level: the **Alaska Permanent Fund** (APF).

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
Ballot Proposition No. 1 Action on Veto of Bills Constitutional Amendment	71,829	39,980
Ballot Proposition No. 2 Permanent Fund From Non- Renewable Resource Revenue Constitutional Amendment	75,588	38,518
Ballot Proposition No. 3 Administration and Review of State Land Disposals Constitutional Amendment	46,652	64,744
Ballot Proposition No. 4 Direct Financial Aid to Students Constitutional Amendment	54,636	64,211
Ballot Proposition No. 5 Initiative to Repeal Limited Entry Initiative	44,304	75,125
Ballot Proposition No. 6 Advisory Vote on Unicameral Legislature Initiative	58,782	55,204




Established in 1976, the Fund comes from the non-renewable resource revenues, royalty incomes, because of the great income generated by resources, in particular oil. In fact, the debate posed attention on the possible use of the great amount of money: the common idea was to deliver it for social benefits. This resulted in the creation of the Alaska Permanent Fund (managed by the state-owned Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation), resulting in a dividend that would be given, yearly, to every individual, without any condition. The entity of the benefit cannot be compared to payments of other projects, but from a structural point of view it is a relevant example. In fact, the entity of the benefit varies every year (depending on the commercial, economic trend), but is around \$1500/\$2000. Of course, this is not enough for a basic living, as far as this sum is given yearly, but still is a form of UBI. The Fund has gained a lot of attention, coming also from researchers and supporters of UBI, mostly for two reasons. Firstly, how it is financed. In fact, the idea is to get those profits coming from resources (exported) constituting very relevant, commercial and strategic assets. An example on the importance of well managing on the one side, but also on the –both- potential and risk of this kind of financing is given by the entity of the dividend in the last years. Because of geopolitical reasons (in this case the Russia-Ukraine war<sup>72</sup>), the dividend in 2022 has been one of the highest in the history of this Fund, reaching around \$3200. The year after, in 2023, it dropped again to usual levels, being set at \$1300 circa<sup>73</sup>.

<sup>72</sup><https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-finance/alaska-dividend-2022/>

<sup>73</sup><https://pfd.alaska.gov/>

**Tab 3.5:** Amount paid to Alaska residents by year

Source: <https://thealaskafrontier.com/do-you-get-paid-to-live-in-alaska/>



This can be a potential, as seen for results in 2023; on the other side, it is risky, depending on external factors (geopolitical, commercial, even environmental in this case). In this last case, an example is given by the projection of the Fund given by Brad Keithley, head of “Alaskans for Sustainable Budgets”, posing the accent on the risks on the nature of the fund in the next years.<sup>74</sup> In conclusion, the Alaskan Fund represents an interesting example, and, more specifically, a real forerunner of an eventual national UBI measure.

Moving to Europe, three experiments (from three different socioeconomic models) are interesting and structured enough to deserve attention. Firstly, in Spain, it has been approved a Temporary Program that would serve as precursor for an eventual measure. More in particular, the Government of **Catalonia** approved the plan in 2021. It was definitely activated in 2023, and will last 2 years. The number of people involved is 10°000: it will be divided into two general groups. On the one side the beneficiaries, on the other side those who will not receive the benefit, playing the similar role of the *control group* of the Kenyan experiment. Furthermore, half of beneficiaries will be chosen throughout Catalonia, while the other half will be chosen from two villages. Wealthiest people have been excluded for this 2-year phase of the experiment: the

<sup>74</sup><https://alaskalandmine.com/landmines/brad-keithleys-chart-of-the-week-how-long-before-the-pfd-is-gone/>

gross annual income must be less than €45000. This choice is understandable when meeting some of the aims of the experiment. The poverty line per individual, in 2021 in Catalonia was more than €900, but it depends on the composition of the household; as a consequence, the poverty threshold for a 2-adult household is €700 ca. per adult. The amount of the monthly benefit consists of €800 and €300 for minors. Among the socioeconomic effects, two elements are the focus of the Pilot Project: the sufficiency and the universality of UBI. On the one hand, it is referred to the sufficiency of the benefit, in order to understand whether starting from poverty thresholds to set the amount is useful; on the other hand, the aim of the Pilot Project is to understand how the universality can affect the community. More specifically, in terms of services, economic cohesion and development in general terms. This is another important feature of the project. Of course, socioeconomic results are crucial: poverty, savings, consumption, education, health, employment, gender equality become all elements useful to understand the qualitative impact of UBI. All these elements are part of social sustainability, in which society improves its individual and collective conditions: from socioeconomic to educational, cultural, environmental. Taking into account academic research, other experiment and the previous experiments<sup>75,76</sup> done, there are some expectations. In fact, positive effects are expected also in this case in terms of poverty, savings, consumption, health in general. Some more specific effects expected do refer also to very internal dynamics. Firstly, the redistribution of domestic affair, and, secondly, as a consequence, even personal relations, increasing individual's independency, autonomy (in favour of women empowerment). Child poverty should be reduced, as well as housing coasts, that will not be a burden. A general decrease of income inequality has been imagined, and mostly positive effects on the labour market too: more job satisfaction, more businesses and less precarious job that will be accepted. It is expected that more time will be dedicated to activities for the well-being of the individual, creating the conditions also for more consumption and more expenditures. On the other side, also the relation between the citizen and the institutions will be taken into account. It is expected that demands for emergency

---

<sup>75</sup><https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/implementing-universal-basic-income-catalonia>

<sup>76</sup>Riutort, Sebastià, Laín, Bru and Julià, Albert. "Basic Income at Municipal Level: Insights from the Barcelona B-MINCOME Pilot" *Basic Income Studies*, vol. 18, no. 1, 2023, pp. 1-30 <https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2021-0047>

social assistance will decrease, in favour of more demand for those services not part of public health care. Social aggregation should increase, spreading volunteer activities and social aggregation in organizations and movements.

Another experiment in the European realm, has taken place in **Finland**. It has not been a real universal income, but a basic income for unemployed, with 2000 beneficiaries. In fact, the aim of the project led by the Finnish Government was to understand the effect of the income in particular on the employment. The project lasted two years, in the two-years period 2017-2018. The benefit value was of €560 per month, equal to the net amount of the Finnish unemployment benefit, but without the obligation to search for a job neither to see the benefit reduced or cut in case of employment. The effects of the experiment have been widely discussed. On the one side, those against the measure, posed the attention on the poor results in terms of employment. In fact, as shown, on the short-term, effects have not been successful<sup>77</sup>. The main fact that confirms the failure of the project in this sense is given by the number of employment days, which remained generally stable. From this point of view, if the aim was to enforce the participation to the labour market, the Finnish experiment has failed. On the other hand, positive effects of the project have been raised up, in order to understand the potential of the measure, and the best frame for its eventual adoption, in the general academic and political discussion. In fact, even in the Finnish case, positive effects in terms of well-being have been discovered. It must be understood – as seen in the previous chapters- the context: Finland has among the lowest rates both in terms of relative and absolute poverty. For this reason, the main results observed and taken into consideration refer to the personal sphere of individuals. Good results have been registered in terms of general health, self-confidence. In fact, according to the results of the final survey, the 46% agreed on an eventual permanent adoption of the basic income on a national level. *“The results from our study could support many of the arguments that have been presented both for and against basic income,” Christian Kroll says. “But as we’ve all learned in the early part of 2020, insecurity is not a good way to live. While basic income can’t solve all our health and societal problems, there is*

---

<sup>77</sup> "Removing Welfare Traps: Employment Responses in the Finnish Basic Income Experiment" by Jouko Verho and Kari Hämäläinen (VATT Institute for Economic Research); and Ohto Kanninen (Labour Institute for Economic Research) is forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

certainly a discussion to be made that it could be part of the solution in times of economic hardship.”<sup>78</sup>The Finnish example poses attention on the framing of the measure, which could create neutral or even negative effects on labour participation. On the other hand, it confirms the trend of other experiments, registering good effects in terms of health, well-being, poverty, consumption and savings.

Another project is interesting and relevant to the discussion: the German **Grundeinkommen Pilotprojekt**. In this case, the origin is mainly private. In fact, it is based on the cooperation between the non-profit association *Mein Grundeinkommen* (*my basic income*) and the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); in addition, also researchers from the Max Planck Institute and the University of Cologne are part of the project. Furthermore, financing comes from 140.000 private individuals, thanks to their donations. The income in this case is set at €1200 monthly per adult individual, without any kind of further condition. The payments have started in 2021, and this phase of study will last until may 2024. In this case, the number of participants is not too high: overall, 1500 individuals will take part to the experiment. In particular, 122 will constitute the experiment group (those receiving the income), while the rest is the group useful for the comparison to those not taking the benefit. Depending on the results, the future of the project will be decided. In this case, this project presents a high sum given every month, if compared to the threshold of *poverty* or *at risk of poverty*<sup>79, 80</sup>. In fact, if compared to the German or the Spanish experiment, the German one is an interesting case, especially in terms of economic benefit: first results, in 2024, will be crucial in understanding first effects of the measure.

### 3.2.3. A first balance on UBI

After having understood UBI on a theoretical level, and projects, experiment around the world, a first balance can be done. Firstly, concerning the points in favour of the

---

<sup>78</sup><https://www.helsinki.fi/en/news/fair-society/universal-basic-income-experiment-finland-new-research-reveals-significant-diversity-participants-experience>

<sup>79</sup>[https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Income-Consumption-Living-Conditions/Living-Conditions-Risk-Poverty/\\_node.html](https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Income-Consumption-Living-Conditions/Living-Conditions-Risk-Poverty/_node.html)

<sup>80</sup><https://www.statista.com/statistics/1352983/monthly-poverty-threshold-germany/#:~:text=Published%20by%20Statista%20Research%20Department%2C%20Apr%2012%2C%202023,to%20be%20over%20the%20poverty%20threshold%20in%20Germany>

measure, the impact on poverty is quite significant, constituting the main scope of the measure. This is more concrete in terms of savings, consumption. This affects also the cultural level, as far as poorest families, in a condition of monthly benefit, do spend more in terms of schooling. Another aspect, in terms of economy (this depends a lot on the specific context in terms of financial, commercial, fiscal features), is linked to a trend, when individual receive UBI, to invest in self-business, economic activities in general. Finally, well-being becomes more spread among individuals, in terms of health. On the other side, doubts are linked to employment and, more specifically, to labour participation, especially on the long term: until now, according to the experiments taken into account, effects have been mostly neutral. The most important discussion concerns the financial aspect. In this terms, four aspects are relevant. Firstly, the frequency of the payment to beneficiaries: whether monthly or yearly, it is crucial for the final result. Second, the amount of the benefit is important, especially for the effects on the labour market. Third, how to finance the measure. In the end, it is crucial to adapt the fiscal regime, in case of adoption of the measure.

### 3.3. Digitalization: a further reason for a path towards social sustainability?

Labour market nature and features has always evolved, developed, creating new features, way of working, jobs. This poses the State in a position in which it must consider those changes in framing its policies. Digitalization, as a consequence has both a qualitative and quantitative impact on the labour market in general and, of course, on employment and unemployment. Digital transformation, intended as *“special kind of organizational change in the enterprise, sector, supply chains, functioning of public administration and entire economies”*<sup>81</sup>, becomes crucial in shaping labour and social policies on the long-term.


---

<sup>81</sup>Hetmańczyk, P. Digitalization and its impact on labour market and education. Selected aspects. *EduInfTechnol* (2023). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10639-023-12203-8>

In this context, qualitative changes will characterize the labour market. On the one hand by creating new kind of jobs, on the other hand, losing specific kind or areas of jobs. In this last case in fact, as observed by Eurofound, “*job loss for workers in low-skilled routine work in manufacturing, such as blue-collar production work and basic clerical work, as observed during recent decades in the EU, will further increase, notably as a result of the potential for automating a large number of the tasks inherent in such jobs. The strongest impact is expected in those sectors most affected by technology adoption, such as automotive, machinery and consumer goods manufacturing. A similar trend is likely to be seen in some services sectors (for example, online retail or banking activities), as a result of the increased use of a combination of automation and digitisation technologies.*”<sup>82</sup> In this dynamic education plays a crucial role, as far as it should shape individual’s education also in terms of digital and working skills, useful in the long-term. In any case the need for a welfare that would support those in difficulties in finding a job, will still be crucial, even if there will be also new opportunities.

**Tab 3.6:** Change in number of employees since 2016 by digitalization intensity of establishments, EU27 and UK, 2019 (%)

Source: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/employment-impactdigitalisation>



Establishments with 10 or more employees active in NACE Rev.2 (European statistical classification of economic activities) sectors B to N and R to S; ‘highly digitalised’ establishments are those in which a high share of staff use computers daily, that are likely to have purchased customised software recently and that use data analytics; ‘high computer use, limited use of other digital technology’ refers to establishments in which a high share of staff use computers daily, while use of robots, customised software and data analytics is limited; ‘high use of robots and other digital technology, limited computer use’ refers to establishments in which a low share of staff use computers daily, but the use of robots, customised software and data analytics is common; ‘limited digitalisation’ refers to establishments in which daily computer use and use of robots, customised software and data analytics are not common.

Source: ECS 2019 management questionnaire


<sup>82</sup> <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/employment-impact-digitalisation>



An indicator that describes the level of digitalization on general terms, is the Digital Economy and Society index (DESI), which “monitors Europe’s overall digital performance and tracks the progress of EU countries in their digital competitiveness.”<sup>83</sup> Looking at the EU performance in the last years, it is clear how digitalization is already affecting and will more and more affect the labour market in the future.

**Tab 3.7:** Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) for the European Union from 2017 to 2022 (Weighted score from 0 to 100)

Source: Statista (<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1371887/eu-digitalization-digital-economy-and-society-index-average/> )




Furthermore, a crucial aim of the EU is digitalization itself, having set the Europe’s Digital Decade policy programme, aimed at a digitalization that will particularly involve, directly and non-, labour market and –complementary- welfare, as clear from some of the main targets.

<sup>83</sup> <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/digital-economy-and-society-index-desi-2022>

**Tab 3.8:** The targets of the proposed Path to the Digital Decade

Source: *Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2022*, European Commission, Thematic Chapters



Source: European Commission

A last element of digitalization must be taken into account: AI (Artificial Intelligence). In fact, even in this case there are different perspectives on the theoretical level, presenting both positive and negative effects in terms of employment. In terms of salaries for examples, AI has not been enough adopted to understand this specific economic aspect. In any case, before understanding how AI will impact, taking into account the wide range of areas of jobs, and the high number of elements that must be considered, it is crucial to have already understand which could be the best measure or welfare scheme to face eventual poverty raise in specific areas, sectors, or social groups.


In this context, youth, especially, play a crucial role. Effects coming from digitalization are already tangible, this should force States in facing socioeconomic issues. In fact, *“youth unemployment can arise for unique reasons, alongside broader labor market issues. In recent years, the rapid transformation of labor markets with technological developments, the change in the way jobs are filled, and the emergence of new jobs are among the main factors affecting youth unemployment. On the other hand, individual reasons, such as opportunities for young people to benefit from education, worries about the future, and market expectations also fuel youth unemployment.”*<sup>84</sup> In fact, even if many studies demonstrate how digitalization is an opportunity and how it has created new jobs, it is widely agreed on how education is crucial in creating the condition for a fully positive influence of digitalization. This can be understood also by

<sup>84</sup>Başol, O.; Sevgi, H.; Yalçın, E.C. The Effect of Digitalization on Youth Unemployment for EU Countries: Treat or Threat? *Sustainability* **2023**, *15*, 11080. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su151411080>

looking at those countries with highest level of digitalization, and those with lowest: the frame, in broad terms, describes the difference between North and Southern member States, as similar in other kind of contexts (poverty, employment, welfare). In this perspective, it is clear how an approach the poses the interests of the society as main priority is effective on multiple levels, even in –quantitative and qualitative– terms of digitalization.


**Tab 3.9:** People with at least basic overall digital skills in 2021 (% of people aged 16-74)

Source: <https://data.europa.eu/en/publications/datastories/towards-2023-european-year-skills>




**Tab 3.10:** Digital Economy and Society Index, 2022

Source: <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/it/policies/desi>



**Tab 3.11:** Human capital dimension (Score 0-100), 2022

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2022, European Commission, Thematic Chapters



As visible both from general DESI data, and those on human capital, differences similar to those related to socioeconomic dynamics are very similar. Northern countries do have higher levels both of digitalization on a national level and on an individual level. Eastern countries, in different phases of development, do occupy different places, but, of course, not the same as Northern. Southern countries, presents a frame in which only Spain does register good results, Portugal is line with EU average, while countries such as Italy, Greece and Cyprus have very negative results in terms of digitalization on both levels. As seen in chapter two, poverty involves lower levels of education and lower access to resources and items, even technological ones. This sees, as a consequences, higher levels of digital poverty, that is reflected –also- in bad results and spread differences within the EU. For this reason, a social sustainability, which involves no poverty, more equality, is crucial also for an efficient development of digitalization, which constitutes a very strategic tool for a gross development of a Member State and, as a consequence, of the EU.

### 3.4. A final balance

At this point it is important to understand which -considering the context presented- could be the best measure in terms of social sustainability, as intended in this work.

Firstly, the main elements concerning minimum wage. It is effective in facing relative poverty, especially when considering working poor. This measure creates the condition for a better welfare. In fact, it is firstly a measure of dignity: it avoid underpaid and exploited jobs. Second, it facilitates a better social and economic inclusion. Minimum wage constitutes a measure useful to help in particular low-income workers: it contributes to bring those workers that were mostly in relative poverty to the average income, crucial for living in median conditions. On the EU level it has been already understood, the value of the measure, as shown by the 2022 Directive on adequate minimum wages. On the other side, it constitutes only a first step, as seen. It does not face poverty in general terms: both absolute and relative poverty. The former is not involved by the action of the measure, while concerning the latter, many groups or families in specific conditions, with specific compositions, are not object of the effect of the measure. Furthermore, it does not create conditions for social sustainability aims, in terms of facing poverty, not developing the frame in which every individual is able to contribute to a sustainable development, but also in terms of equality, effects on health, well-being, education, and other spheres linked to social sustainability.

For this reason, it seems as a basic measure that should be adopted –also to face labour market issues, as seen-, but that is not enough effective, the perspective presented.

On the other side, universal basic income seems a very complete measure. Doubts, are linked to financial and employment issues. If correctly set, at a level that guarantees a socioeconomic life near to the median condition, but lower than median income jobs, the measure could be crucial in eliminating absolute poverty and totally reducing relative poverty. This would create the conditions towards a social sustainability, as seen from the comparison of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Chapter. Equality, no poverty, higher education quality, more gender equality, well-being, health, social aggregation, and even more participation and cooperation between institutions and society, all these, would

become aims more easy to reach. Social wealth, inclusion, more attention to the individual –as seen mostly in Northern member States- is a strategic frame in order to pursue a socioeconomic development. In fact, by deleting absolute poverty and mitigating the relative one, social development becomes easier.

In this context, EU can play a crucial role. In fact, a first step has been presented through the directive and the EU role in the realm of SDGs. Considering those countries that still should implement the minimum wage, Italy figures as the one which most needs minimum wage, taking into account its socioeconomic condition. Taking into account the role of digitalization, of IA, changes in labour market, UBI may become on the top not only of national agendas, but also of sovra-national, such as EU. In fact, the role of digitalization and of IA in particular, could increasingly become relevant. Thanks to the capacity to collect, analyze, order data, IA could be a crucial tool in the EU, in order to have both a deepen socioeconomic frame (through all the socioeconomic indicators), useful for understanding the best level of UBI for a specific member State. UBI could even be a first step that, together with technology (AI), could set the condition for a more structured welfare able to identify the most vulnerable groups that need support. In conclusion, having an approach aimed at deleting absolute poverty, UBI would be a crucial step in this sense, anticipating new kind of measure or new welfare structures, that will develop together with AI and technology in general. However, it is clear how countries with high social protection do have an efficient condition too in terms of labour market, and do register very good social sustainability results'. Instead, countries –even big economies- with low social protection and a non equal and non developed labour market, do have more difficulties. In a context looking at aims on the medium and long term, UBI -if well financed- together with an adequate fiscal regime can be effective in reaching –sooner and in a more effective way- aims linked to social sustainability. EU, in this sense, could even constitute (thanks to this measure or similar) a new socioeconomic model, that could be useful also for other areas of the World, enforcing its role on the global context.

## CONCLUSION

The aim of this work was to understand how (in the EU context) a path towards social sustainability requires a socioeconomic development, taking into account present and future challenges'. Having understood implications of spread poverty, the comparison on multiple levels between two crucial Member States such as Italy and Germany makes clearer the importance of social protection. In fact, even if not part of the Scandinavian model, Germany has put more attention on welfare. This poses this country, in a better position on the path towards social sustainability. Equality and wealth do have positive impact on the civil society, which can become not only the main beneficiary but also a crucial partner in pursuing a socioeconomic development. This kind of development, which is aimed at improving individual's and family's economic conditions, is crucial in creating a frame more similar to the Northern EU member states. These last, in fact, having understood negative effects deriving from poverty and spread inequality, do propose an approach that poses social policies (welfare) on a very high position of interest. In doing so, these countries do register better results both on socioeconomic and environmental terms. Furthermore, digital challenges impose institutions to be prepared in case of unemployment effects deriving from those and other challenges. It has been understood how the actual consumption system is not sustainable. Structural actions in this terms, become very difficult, for many reasons. Taking into account the interests of various actors, groups of interests (both from the civil society and not), and taking into account the experience and the reality of northern EU countries, a good compromise could be represented by posing needs of society at the top of interests. This could even create the conditions for a transition towards a more sustainable socioeconomic system. Furthermore, in this context, the development of technology and AI in particular, could be a crucial tool not only in determining the best measure/set of measures, but also in terms of adoption of the same, facilitating the entire process looking at a development both of welfare and, simultaneously, of labour market. Reaching a socioeconomic equilibrium becomes a key for an efficient development. In an historical moment with many doubts and many challenges, EU could become (if medium and long term aims

will be reached), an example also for other areas -in terms of sustainability-, enforcing its role in the global stage.



## SOURCES:

ACEA, 2023, *Vehicles in use: Europe 2023*

Alaminos Aguilera Estefania, Sigita Geske, Orfanou Maria, Kaczmarek-Firth Agata, Rasim Ryustemk, 2023, "What happened with income inequality in Europe during 2020-2022?", 64th ISI (International Statistical Institute), World Statistics Congress - Ottawa, Canada

Awaworyi Churchill, Sefa & Smyth, Russell, 2022, *Local area crime and energy poverty*, Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C)

Başol, O.; Sevgi, H.; Yalçın, E.C., 2023, *The Effect of Digitalization on Youth Unemployment for EU Countries: Treat or Threat?* Sustainability, 15, 11080. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su151411080>

Bastagli, F., Hagen-Zanker, J., Harman, L., Barca, V., Sturge, G., Schmidt, T., 2016, *Cash transfers: what does the evidence say? A rigorous review of programme impact and the role of design and implementation features*, London: Overseas Development Institute

Bastasin C., 2022, *The German lessons about the "reddito di cittadinanza"*, Luiss SEP Policy Brief 23/2022

Battisti Anna Maria, 2022, *Occupational welfare in Europe: models compared*, Italian Labour Law e-Journal Issue 2, Vol. 15

Bekker S, Mailand M., 2019, *The European flexicurity concept and the Dutch and Danish flexicurity models: How have they managed the Great Recession?* Soc Policy Admin. 2019;53:142–155. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12441>

Bergbauer, Stephanie & Giovannini, Alessandro & Hernborg, Nils, 2022, *Economic inequality and public trust in the European Central Bank*. Economic Bulletin Articles, European Central Bank, vol. 3

Björn Bremer and Reto Bürgisser, 2022, *Public opinion on welfare state recalibration in times of austerity: evidence from survey experiments*, Max Planck Institute for the

Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany and Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

F. Blolse, D. Chironi, D. della Porta, M. Planta, 2023, *Inequality and elections in Italy, 1994-2018*, Research Paper – Italy and Europe, Italian Economic Journal, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40797-022-00218-y>

Borrell-Porta, M., de Quintana, J., Segura, A., León, G., Ramos, X. & Vives-i-Bastida J., 2023, *Assessment: Universal Basic Income Pilot Project, Recommendations for an Evaluable Design.*, Barcelona: Ivàlua ([https://ivalua.cat/sites/default/files/2023-03/Assessment %20design UBI Iva%CC%80lua final ANG.pdf](https://ivalua.cat/sites/default/files/2023-03/Assessment_%20design%20UBI%20Iva%CC%80lua%20final%20ANG.pdf) )

Börschlein, E.-B., M. Bossler, J.S. Wiemann, 2021, *Gesetzlicher Mindestlohn: 2022 dürfte der Rückstand gegenüber der Tariflohnentwicklung aufgeholt sein.*, IAB-Forum. February 15, 2021. Institute for Employment Research (IAB).

Bossler Mario and Schank Thorsten, 2023, *Wage Inequality in Germany after the Minimum Wage Introduction*, Journal of Labor Economics 41:3, 813-857

Bruckmeier, K. and Becker, S, 2018, *Auswirkung des Mindestlohns auf die Armutsgefährdung und die Lage von erwerbstätigen Arbeitslosengeld II-Bezieherinnen und -Beziehern*, Studie im Auftrag der Mindestlohnkommission, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg

Bruttel O., Baumann A. & Dütsch M., 2018, *The new German statutory minimum wage in comparative perspective: Employment effects and other adjustment channels.*, *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 24 (2) 145–162.

Bundeskriminalamt, 2022 *Kriminalität im Kontext von Zuwanderung* | Kernaussagen Januar-September 2022

Burki Khan Muhammad Ali, Burki Umar, Najam Usama, 2021, *Environmental degradation and poverty: A bibliometric review*, Regional Sustainability, Volume 2, Issue 4, Pages 324-336, ISSN 2666-660X, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsus.2022.01.001>

Busse Reinhard, Blümel Miriam, Knieps Franz, Bärnighausen Till, 2017, “*Statutory health insurance in Germany: a health system shaped by 135 years of solidarity, self-governance, and competition*”, Lancet

Calderoni, Francesco, 2013, *Measuring the Presence of the Mafias in Italy*. 2014 In *Organized Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention*, edited by Stefano Caneppele and Francesco Calderoni, 239–49. New York: Springer International Publishing.  
[http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-01839-3\\_27](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-01839-3_27)

Caliendo, M., C. Schröder, L. Wittbrodt, 2019, *The causal effects of the minimum wage introduction in Germany – An overview.*, German Economic Review 20(3): 257-292.

Campo F., Giunti S., Mendola M., 2021, *The refugee crisis and Right-Wing Populism: Evidence from the Italian Dispersal Policy*, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, IZA DP No. 14084

Cerruto Maurizio, 2021, *La partecipazione elettorale in Italia*, *Quaderni di Sociologia*, 60 | 17-39. <https://journals.openedition.org/qds/537#text>

Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G, 2022, *World Inequality Report 2022*,. World Inequality Lab.

Checchi Daniele (University of Milan) and Cecilia García-Peñalosa, (CNRS and GREQAM), 2008, *LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND INCOME INEQUALITY*, Paper presented to the Economic Policy Panel meeting (Ljubana 18-19/4/2008)

Conesa Juan Carlos, Bo Li, Qian Li, 2023, *A quantitative evaluation of universal basic income*, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 223, 104881, ISSN 0047-2727, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104881>.  
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272723000634>

Copeland, P., 2023, *Poverty and social exclusion in the EU: third-order priorities, hybrid governance and the future potential of the field.*, Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 29(2), 219-233. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10242589231171091>

L. DallaPellegrina, G. Di Maio, M. Gilli, 2022, *Abstention and Populist Voting: Evidence from the Italian 2018 Election*, Center for European Studies Paper Series, No 503 September 2022

De Courson, B., Nettle, D., 2021, *Why do inequality and deprivation produce high crime and low trust?*, *Sci Rep* **11**, 1937. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-80897-8>

De Nadai, M., Xu, Y., Letouzé, E. et al, 2020, *Socio-economic, built environment, and mobility conditions associated with crime: a study of multiple cities.*, *Sci Rep* **10**, 13871

Deakin Nicholas, Catherine Jones Finer Catherine, Matthews Bob, 2022, *Welfare and the State (Critical Concepts in Political Science)* 1st Edition, by Cantó O, Figari F, Fiorio CV, Kuypers S, Marchal S, Romaguera-de-la-Cruz M, Tasseva IV, Verbist G., *Welfare Resilience at the Onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic in a Selection of European Countries: Impact on Public Finance and Household Incomes.*, *Rev Income Wealth*. Jun;68(2):293-322. doi: 10.1111/roiw.12530. Epub 2021 Jul 1.

Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2013, *Distributional effects of a minimum wage in a welfare state – The case of Germany*. SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 617. DIW Berlin.

Dustmann Christian, Attila Lindner, Uta Schönberg, Matthias Umkehrer, Philipp vom Berge, 2022, *Reallocation Effects of the Minimum Wage*, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Volume 137, Issue 1, Pages 267–328, <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab028>, <https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/137/1/267/6355463>

Esping-Andersen Gosta, 1990, *The three worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton University,

EU Commission, 2010, *Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, communication from the Commission

Eurispes, 2023 *La criminalità: tra realtà e percezione*, Ministero dell'Interno

Eurofound, 2017 *In-work poverty in the EU*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

Eurofound, 2021, *Living and working in Europe*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

Eurofound, 2023, *Minimum wages: Non-compliance and enforcement across EU Member States – Comparative report*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

European Commission, 2022, *Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2022*, Thematic Chapters

European Commission, 2011, *The measurement of extreme poverty in the European Union*, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Manuscript completed in January 2011

European Commission, 2023, *Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2023*, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Directorate F

Fitzpatrick, Pamela, 2023, *Universal basic income: An idea whose time has come or just another mechanism to grease the wheels of capitalism?*, *Journal of Global Faultlines* 9 (2):225-234.

Fitzpatrick, T., 1999, *Freedom and Security: An Introduction to the Basic Income Debate.*, London: Macmillan Press

Fromm, E., 1966, *The Psychological Aspects of the Guaranteed Income*, in R. Theobald, *The Guaranteed Income*. New York: Doubleday & Co.

German Federal Employment Agency, 2022, *Reports: The Labour Market in Brief – The German Labour Market in 2022*, Statistics/Labour Market Reporting, Nuremberg

Groll, D., 2016, *Mindestlohn: Hinweise auf Jobverlusteherhärtensich.*, *Wirtschaftsdienst* 96(2): 151- 152

Hasdell, R, 2020, *What we know about Universal Basic Income: A cross-synthesis of reviews.*, Stanford, CA: Basic Income Lab

Hassel Anke, Palier Bruno, 2020, *Growth and Welfare in Advanced Capitalist Economies, How Have Growth Regimes Evolved?*

Heise, Arne; Pusch, Toralf, 2018, *Introducing minimum wages in Germany: Employment effects in a post Keynesian perspective*, ZÖSS Discussion Paper, No. 68, Universität Hamburg, Zentrum für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien (ZÖSS), Hamburg

Hemerijck Anton, 2005, *Towards developmental welfare recalibration in Europe*, Director, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, The Hague, The Netherlands

Hemerijck, Anton, Huguenot-NOËL, Robin, Matsaganis Manos, 2022 *Welfare resilience in Europe. Contours of a post-Covid social compass for the EU*, , STG Policy Briefs, 2022/02 - <https://hdl.handle.net/1814/73952>

Hetmańczyk, P., 2023, *Digitalization and its impact on labour market and education.*, Selected aspects. *EduInfTechnol.* <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10639-023-12203-8>

Immel Lea, Peichl Andreas, 2020, *“Regional Inequality in Germany: Where Do the Rich Live and Where Do the Poor Live?”*, ifoInstitut, München, ifoSchnelldienst, 2020, 73, Nr. 05, 43-47

ILO (Internaitonal Labour Office), 2009, *From Bismarck to Beveridge: Social security for all*, ILO (International Labour Office), WORLD OF WORK, NO. 67

Istat (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica), 2022, *Le statistiche dell’Istat sulla povertà | Anno 2021*

Istat (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica), 2023, *Le statistiche dell’Istat sulla povertà | Anno 2022*

Jenson, J, 2015, *Social Innovation: Redesigning the Welfare Diamond*, in: Nicholls, A., Simon, J., Gabriel, M. (eds) *New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research*. Palgrave Macmillan, London. [https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137506801\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137506801_5)

Jochen Clasen, Daniel Clegg and Jon Kvist, 2012, *European labour market policies in (the) crisis*, Working Paper 2012.12, European Trade Union Institute

Kangas O, Ylikännö M., 2023, *Basic Income and the Status of Women in an Established Gender-Equal Welfare State: Results from the Finnish Basic Income Experiment.*, Int J

Environ Res Public Health. 18;20(3):1733. doi: 10.3390/ijerph20031733. PMID: 36767105; PMCID: PMC9914593.

EU Commission, 2008, *Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security*, COM(2007)359 final

Khan Salim, Wang Yahong, Asma Zeeshan, 2022, *Impact of poverty and income inequality on the ecological footprint in Asian developing economies: Assessment of Sustainable Development Goals*, , Energy reports 8, 670-679

Knabe, A., R. Schöb, M. Thum, 2014, *Der flächendeckende Mindestlohn..* Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 15(2): 133-157.

Knabe, A., R. Schöb, M. Thum, 2020 *Bilanz nach fünf Jahren: Was hat der gesetzliche Mindestlohngebracht?* ifoSchnelldienst 73(4/2020): 3-6. Müller, K.-U., V. Steiner

Lafortune, G., Fuller, G., Bermont Diaz, L., Kloke-Lesch, A., Koundouri, P., Riccaboni A., 2022, *Achieving the SDGs: Europe's Compass in a Multipolar World*. Europe Sustainable Development Report 2022. SDSN and SDSN Europe. France: Paris.

Lelkes Osolya, Zólyomi Eszter, 2008, *Poverty Across Europe: The Latest Evidence Using the EU-SILC Survey*, European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research

Mancilla A, 2019, *The human right to subsistence*, Philosophy Compass; e12618. <https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12618>

Manning A., 2013, *Minimum wages: A view from the UK.*, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik,14 57-66

Marinescu I, 2018, *No strings attached: The behavioral effects of U.S. unconditional cash transfer programs.*,National Bureau of Economic Research

Matsaganis, M., 2020, *History and politics of the minimum wage*, in DASTU Working Paper Series, n. 02/2020 (LPS.09)

McKinnon, Catriona, 2003, *Basic Income, Self-Respect and Reciprocity*, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 143–58. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24355019>.

Moreno, L., 2006, *The Model of Social Protection in Southern Europe: Enduring Characteristics?*, Revue française des affaires <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfas.en605.0073>

Moxon Dan and Barta Ondrej, 2018, *Structured Dialogue Cycle VI Thematic report*, from The Pool of European Youth Researchers <https://zenodo.org/records/3716244#.XnN3XKj0mUk>

Müller, Torsten, 2023, *Minimum Wage Developments in 2022: Fighting the Cost-Of-Living Crisis*, (March 30, 2023). ETUI Research Paper - Policy Brief, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4404709> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4404709>

Neef Theresa, Sodano Alice, 2022, *Inequality Trends in Europe*, World Inequality Lab - Issue Brief 2022/04

Nora Milotay, Eamonn Noonan (editors), Denise Chircop, Klaus Müller, Cecilia Navarra, Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass, 2022, *EU welfare systems and the challenges of poverty and inequality*, EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Authors: PE 698.916 –

OECD, 2018, *A broken social elevator? How to promote social mobility*

Ohlert C., 2022, *Effects of the German minimum wage on earnings and working time using establishment data*, 1. Auflage. Dortmund: Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin,

Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite A/RES/70/1 Assemblea Generale Settantesima sessione punti dell'agenda 15 e 116 ,Distr.: Generale 21 ottobre 2015 , Risoluzione adottata dall'Assemblea Generale il 25 settembre 2015 [senza riferimento a una Commissione Principale (A/70/L.I)] 70/1. Trasformare il nostro mondo: l'Agenda 2030 per lo Sviluppo Sostenibile

Parijs, Philippe Van, 2003, *Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?*, (Oxford, 1997; online edn, Oxford Academic,

Parijs, Philippe Van., 2001, *Real Freedom, the Market and the Family: A Reply to Seven Critics*, *Analyse&Kritik*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 106-131. <https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2001-0109>



- Paul D., 2021, *Merging the Poverty and Environment Agendas*, International Institute for Sustainable Development
- R. Peña-Casas, M. Latta, 2004, *Working Poor in the European Union*, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
- Perkiö, J., 2014, *Universal Basic Income: A New Tool for Development Policy?*, Kansainvalinen Solidaarisuutyo: International Security Work
- Pianta, M., 2020 *Italy's Political Upheaval and the Consequences of Inequality.*, *Intereconomics* 55, 13–17 ( <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-020-0862-8>)
- Pierson Christopher, 2006, *Beyond the Welfare State? The new political economy of welfare*, Polity press (3<sup>rd</sup> edition)
- J. Price & Jae Song, 2018, *The Long-Term Effects of Cash Assistance*, David, Working Papers 621, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations
- Raitano, M., Jessoula M., Pavolini, E., Natili, M., 2019, *ESPN Thematic Report on Inwork poverty – Italy*, European Social Policy Network (ESPN), Brussels: European Commission.
- Riutort, Sebastià, Laín, Bru and Julià, Albert, 2023, *Basic Income at Municipal Level: Insights from the Barcelona B-MINCOME Pilot*, *Basic Income Studies*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1-30 <https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2021-0047>
- Ruesga-Benito, S.M.; González-Laxe, F.; Picatoste, 2018, *Sustainable Development, Poverty, and Risk of Exclusion for Young People in the European Union: The Case of NEETs.*, X., *Sustainability*, 10, 4708. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124708>
- Sacchi Stefano, Vesan Patrik, 2015, *Employment policy: segmentation, deregulation and reforms in the Italian labour market*, pp.71-99
- Schmitz, S., 2017, *The effects of Germany's new minimum wage on employment and welfare dependency*, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics, Discussion Paper 2017/21

Shue Henry, 2020 *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy: 40th Anniversary Edition.*, NED-New edition, Princeton University Press, JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqsdnkw>. Accessed 26 Dec. 2023.

Spicker Paul, 2013, *Liberal welfare states*, published in B Greve (ed) *The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State*, London: Routledge, pp 193-201

Standing Guy, 2021, "Basic Income Pilots: Uses, Limitations and Design Principles", *Basic Income Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 75-99. <https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2021-0021>

Starke Peter, 2008, *Radical Welfare State Retrenchment: A Comparative Analysis*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Starke Peter, 2020, *What is Retrenchment*, University of Southern Denmark

Tanner, Michael D., 2015, *The Pros and Cons of a Guaranteed National Income*.

The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team, 2014, *The impact of Kenya's Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children on human capital*, *Journal of Development Effectiveness*, 4:1, 38-49, DOI: [10.1080/19439342.2011.653578](https://doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2011.653578)

Tulchinsky TH, 2018, *Bismarck and the Long Road to Universal Health Coverage...*, *Case Studies in Public Health*. 131–79. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-804571-8.00031-7.

Tuparevska Elena, Santibáñez Rosa & Solabarrieta Josu , 2020, *Social exclusion in EU lifelong learning policies: prevalence and definitions*, *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 39:2, 179-190, DOI: [10.1080/02601370.2020.1728404](https://doi.org/10.1080/02601370.2020.1728404)

UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), 2022, *Europe Sustainable Development Report 2022, Achieving the SDGs: Europe's Compass in a Multipolar World*

Suri et. al, 2023, *Universal Basic Income: Short-Term Results from a Long-Term Experiment in Kenya*

UNDP China Office, 2017, *Universal basic income: A working paper | A Policy option for China beyond 2020?*

Verho, Jouko, Kari Hämäläinen, and Ohto Kanninen, 2022, *Removing Welfare Traps: Employment Responses in the Finnish Basic Income Experiment.*, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 14 (1): 501-22.

Witt, U., 2017, *The evolution of consumption and its welfare effects.*, *J Evol Econ* **27**, 273–293 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-016-0459-3>

### WEB SOURCES:

<https://www.acea.auto/press-release/electric-cars-lower-income-countries-fall-behind-with-uptake-linked-to-gdp-per-capita/>

<https://www.agenzianova.com/news/crescono-le-poverta-a-milano-in-un-giorno-4600-persone-hanno-chiesto-aiuto-a-pane-quotidiano/>

<https://alaskapublic.org/2023/12/07/key-findings-released-in-kenya-universal-basic-income-experiment/>

<https://alaskalandmine.com/landmines/brad-keithleys-chart-of-the-week-how-long-before-the-pfd-is-gone/>

[https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2023/05/26/italy-has-highest-male-neet-rate-in-eu-eurostat\\_dd78c9e7-ff66-4a71-8cc8-eb1abecaf1ce.html#:~:text=17.7%25%20of%20young%20men%20not%20in%20employment%2C%20education%20or%20training&text=\(ANSA\)%20%2D%20ROME%2C%20MAY,29%20was%2017.7%25%20last%20year](https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2023/05/26/italy-has-highest-male-neet-rate-in-eu-eurostat_dd78c9e7-ff66-4a71-8cc8-eb1abecaf1ce.html#:~:text=17.7%25%20of%20young%20men%20not%20in%20employment%2C%20education%20or%20training&text=(ANSA)%20%2D%20ROME%2C%20MAY,29%20was%2017.7%25%20last%20year)

<https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/en/financial-support/citizens-benefits>

<https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/lexikon/minijob>

<https://basicincome.org/history/>

<https://basicincome.org/news/2021/11/ubi-pilot-in-catalonia/>

[https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik/2022/Land/Faelle/LA-F-02-T01-Laender-Faelle-HZ.xls.xlsx?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=4](https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik/2022/Land/Faelle/LA-F-02-T01-Laender-Faelle-HZ.xls.xlsx?__blob=publicationFile&v=4)

<https://www.borgenmagazine.com/kenya-ubi/>

<https://www.britannica.com/money/topic/welfare-state>

[https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/2030-climate-energy-framework\\_it](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/2030-climate-energy-framework_it)

<https://data.europa.eu/en/publications/datastories/towards-2023-european-year-skills>

[https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2021/03/PE21\\_113\\_p001.html](https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2021/03/PE21_113_p001.html)

<https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Labour/Labour-Market/Unemployment/Tables/lrarb001.html#242346>

[https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Income-Consumption-Living-Conditions/Living-Conditions-Risk-Poverty/\\_node.html](https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Income-Consumption-Living-Conditions/Living-Conditions-Risk-Poverty/_node.html)

<https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=eeb>

<https://digital-skills-jobs.europa.eu/en/inspiration/research/rise-digital-labour-market-2022>

<https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/it/policies/desi>

<https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/digital-economy-and-society-index-desi-2022>

[https://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/diw\\_01.c.797177.de/basic\\_income\\_pilot\\_project\\_magazine.pdf](https://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/diw_01.c.797177.de/basic_income_pilot_project_magazine.pdf)

<https://www.dw.com/en/germany-what-poverty-looks-like-in-a-rich-country/a-63393501>

[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/macroeconomic\\_and\\_sectoral/hicp/html/index.en.htm](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/macroeconomic_and_sectoral/hicp/html/index.en.htm)

[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economicbulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202203\\_02~f9d2d059f0.en.html#:~:text=Income%20and%20wealth%20inequality%20in,more%20rapidly%20than%20income%20inequality](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economicbulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202203_02~f9d2d059f0.en.html#:~:text=Income%20and%20wealth%20inequality%20in,more%20rapidly%20than%20income%20inequality)

[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202203\\_02~f9d2d059f0.en.html](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202203_02~f9d2d059f0.en.html)

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living\\_conditions\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_poverty\\_and\\_social\\_exclusion&oldid=584082](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_poverty_and_social_exclusion&oldid=584082)

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Press-overseas-2021-ch-Yellow-Orange-Red.png>

<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=2057&furtherEvents=yes#navItem-1>

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_22\\_6462](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_6462)

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20220128-2>

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Percentage\\_point](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Percentage_point)

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary%3APurchasing\\_power\\_parities\\_\(PPPs\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary%3APurchasing_power_parities_(PPPs))

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230524-1>

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Statistics\\_on\\_young\\_people\\_neither\\_in\\_employment\\_nor\\_in\\_education\\_or\\_training](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Statistics_on_young_people_neither_in_employment_nor_in_education_or_training)

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20221219-3>

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living\\_conditions\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_work\\_intensity](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_work_intensity)

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230614-1#:~:text=In%202022%2C%2095.3%20million%20people,household%20with%20very%20low%20work>

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Employment\\_rate\\_by\\_sex,\\_2022\\_\(age\\_group\\_20-64,\\_percentage\\_of\\_total\\_population\\_for\\_each\\_category\).png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Employment_rate_by_sex,_2022_(age_group_20-64,_percentage_of_total_population_for_each_category).png)

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living\\_conditions\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_material\\_deprivation\\_and\\_economic\\_strain](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_material_deprivation_and_economic_strain)

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Minimum\\_wages,\\_July\\_2023\\_and\\_July\\_2013\\_\(levels,\\_in\\_%E2%82%AC\\_per\\_month\\_and\\_average\\_annual\\_growth,\\_in\\_%25\).png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Minimum_wages,_July_2023_and_July_2013_(levels,_in_%E2%82%AC_per_month_and_average_annual_growth,_in_%25).png)

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU\\_statistics\\_on\\_income\\_and\\_living\\_conditions\\_\(EU-SILC\)\\_methodology\\_-\\_in-work\\_poverty](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_statistics_on_income_and_living_conditions_(EU-SILC)_methodology_-_in-work_poverty)

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg\\_05\\_20/default/table?lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_05_20/default/table?lang=en)

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Statistics\\_on\\_young\\_people\\_neither\\_in\\_employment\\_nor\\_in\\_education\\_or\\_training#The\\_NEET\\_rate\\_within\\_the\\_EU\\_and\\_its\\_Member\\_States\\_in\\_2022](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Statistics_on_young_people_neither_in_employment_nor_in_education_or_training#The_NEET_rate_within_the_EU_and_its_Member_States_in_2022)

[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Minimum\\_wage\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Minimum_wage_statistics)

<https://www.econopoly.ilsole24ore.com/2022/11/04/elezioni-voto-cambiamento/>

[https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/daviz/new-electric-vehicles-by-country-1/#tab-chart\\_1](https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/daviz/new-electric-vehicles-by-country-1/#tab-chart_1)

<https://www.eea.europa.eu/ims/new-registrations-of-electric-vehicles>

<https://elbil.no/english/norwegian-ev-policy/>

<https://www.electrive.com/2022/11/08/sweden-drops-ev-subsidies-with-immediate-effect/>

<https://eu-dashboards.sdgindex.org/chapters>

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022L2041#PP2Contents>

<https://eurispes.eu/news/eurispes-risultati-dellindice-di-permeabilita-dei-territori-alla-criminalita-organizzata-ipco/>

<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2011/living-standards-at-risk-in-low-to-middle-income-households>

<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/publications/2023/minimum-wages-non-compliance-and-enforcement-across-eu>

<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/employment-impact-digitalisation>

<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/topic/working-poor>

<https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/01/12/nearly-half-of-europeans-say-their-standards-of-living-have-already-declined-as-crises-mou>

<https://www.euronews.com/next/2023/02/08/minimum-wages-have-declined-because-of-soaring-inflation-this-is-how-things-stand-across-e>

<https://www.euronews.com/business/2023/04/19/what-are-the-new-rules-on-minimum-wages-for-workers-in-the-european-union>

<https://www.euronews.com/business/2023/01/25/minimum-income-initiatives-helping-the-eus-most-vulnerable-households>

<https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/11/28/the-ev-market-is-booming-in-iceland-can-the-rest-of-europe-catch-up>

<https://www.euronews.com/next/2023/02/08/minimum-wages-have-declined-because-of-soaring-inflation-this-is-how-things-stand-across->





<https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2023/03/07/mia-il-nuovo-reddito-di-cittadinanza-riduce-importi-e-beneficiari-come-si-puo-vivere-con-375-euro/7088357/>

[https://www.ilmessaggero.it/italia/onlus\\_una\\_voce\\_per\\_padre\\_pio\\_programma\\_obiettivo\\_italia\\_poverta\\_scuola\\_pandemia\\_18\\_giugno\\_2021-6030132.html?refresh=cens](https://www.ilmessaggero.it/italia/onlus_una_voce_per_padre_pio_programma_obiettivo_italia_poverta_scuola_pandemia_18_giugno_2021-6030132.html?refresh=cens)

<https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/il-reddito-cittadinanza-premia-single-sono-44per cento-beneficiari-AExOkvaB>

<https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/tra-disoccupati-e-scoraggiati-quasi-5-milioni-persone-inserire-lavoro-AEfFloKC>

<https://insidetime.org/poverty-and-crime/#:~:text=Though%20poverty%20does%20not%20directly,breeding%20ground%20for%20criminal%20activity>

<https://www.investopedia.com/news/history-of-universal-basic-income/#toc-history-of-universal-basic-income-ubi>

<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/welfare-state.asp>

<https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/staff-welfare/resilience.pdf>

<https://jointsdgfund.org/article/universal-basic-income-means-gender-responsive-social-protection>

<https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/162219>

[https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/publication/world-inequality-report-2022\\_en](https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/publication/world-inequality-report-2022_en)

<https://lab24.ilsole24ore.com/indice-della-criminalita/indexT.php>

<https://lab24.ilsole24ore.com/indice-della-criminalita/>

<https://landgeist.com/2021/01/29/electric-cars/>

<https://landgeist.com/2023/09/02/annual-working-hours-in-europe/>

<https://mashable.com/article/cities-with-universal-basic-income-guaranteed-income-programs>

<https://www.mef.gov.it/focus/Decreto-Cura-Italia-cosa-prevede-per-le-famiglie/>

<https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/how-a-universal-basic-income-stabilized-kenyans-bad-times>

<https://morningsignout.com/international-health-care-systems-part-3-the-bismarck-model/>

<https://nordics.info/show/artikel/principles-of-welfare-distribution>

[https://www.numbeo.com/crime/rankings\\_by\\_country.jsp?title=2022&region=150](https://www.numbeo.com/crime/rankings_by_country.jsp?title=2022&region=150)

<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/2e9dd941-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/2e9dd941-en>

<https://www.openpolis.it/come-sta-cambiando-il-rischio-poverta-nelle-aree-metropolitane/>

<https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2021-06-14-basic-income-scheme-tested-germany>

<https://phys.org/news/2021-06-finnish-basic-income-short-term-employment.html>

<https://www.pilotprojekt-grundeinkommen.de/english>

[https://presidencia.gencat.cat/en/ambits\\_d\\_actuacio/renda-basica-universal/index.html](https://presidencia.gencat.cat/en/ambits_d_actuacio/renda-basica-universal/index.html)

<https://project-sprouts.com/does-poverty-cause-crime/>

<https://rethink.earth/redefining-poverty-in-kenyas-fishing-villages/>

<https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/why-us-italy-seeks-way-out-low-wage-economy-trap-2022-06-16/>

<https://www.robeco.com/en-int/glossary/sustainable-investing/country-sustainability-ranking>

<https://www.romatoday.it/economia/report-poverta-roma-cgil.html>

<https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/rights/>

<https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/implementing-universal-basic-income-catalonia>

<https://www.solidar.org/en/news/momentum-for-minimum-income-in-the-eu-and-the-need-for-a-framework->

[directive#:~:text=Adequate%20minimum%20income%20schemes%20are,operating%20within%20social%20protection%20systems](https://www.solidar.org/en/news/momentum-for-minimum-income-in-the-eu-and-the-need-for-a-framework-directive#:~:text=Adequate%20minimum%20income%20schemes%20are,operating%20within%20social%20protection%20systems)

<https://www.ssa.gov/history/ottob.html#:~:text=Germany%20became%20the%20first%20nation,letter%20to%20the%20German%20Parliament.>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/685943/cpi-inflation-rate-europe/>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1352983/monthly-poverty-threshold-germany/#:~:text=Published%20by%20Statista%20Research%20Department%2C%20Apr%2012%2C%202023,to%20be%20over%20the%20poverty%20threshold%20in%20Germany>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1359792/recipients-of-benefits-germany/>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/664040/top-provinces-for-crime-rate-italy/>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1081057/crime-rate-in-germany/#:~:text=Crime%20rate%20per%20100%20thousand%20people%20Berlin%20Bremen,Bavaria%200%2010%2C0002%2C500%205%2C000%207%2C500%2012%2C500%2015%2C000%2017%2C500>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1371887/eu-digitalization-digital-economy-and-society-index-average/>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1345354/at-risk-of-poverty-rate-germany/>

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/619321/at-risk-of-poverty-rate-italy/>

<https://tg24.sky.it/cronaca/2023/01/06/senzatetto-in-italia>

<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2023/jun/04/universal-basic-income-of-1600-pounds-a-month-to-be-trialled-in-england>

<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/may/07/finnish-basic-income-pilot-improved-wellbeing-study-finds-coronavirus>

<https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2018/jan/12/money-for-nothing-is-finlands-universal-basic-income-trial-too-good-to-be-true>

<https://www.theigc.org/blogs/gdp-adequate-measure-development>

[https://www.themayor.eu/en/a/view/catalonia-takes-the-first-step-on-its-universal-basic-income-journey-9425#google\\_vignette](https://www.themayor.eu/en/a/view/catalonia-takes-the-first-step-on-its-universal-basic-income-journey-9425#google_vignette)

<https://www.themayor.eu/en/a/view/catalonia-s-universal-basic-income-tryout-to-start-on-1-january-2023-10914>

<https://time.com/6097523/compton-universal-basic-income/>

<https://www.ubie.org/barcelona2024/>

<https://www.ubie.org/the-unheard-results-of-the-finnish-basic-income-experiment/>

<https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2021/Policy-brief-Universal-basic-income-en.pdf>

<https://www.voicesofyouth.org/blog/relationship-between-poverty-and-environment#:~:text=Poverty%20often%20causes%20people%20to%20put%20relative%20more,needs%2C%20overexploitation%20of%20natural%20resources%20and%20more%20deforestation>

<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/economy/universal-basic-income-ubi-pilots-worked-out>

<https://weall.org/resource/finland-universal-basic-income-pilot>

<https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article247165228/Buergergeld-Mehr-als-5-Millionen-Bezieher-erhalten-deutlich-hoehere-Leistungen.html>

<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/02/01/pove-f01.html>